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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The current investigation explores the possibility of surpassing or subordinating 
epistemology to ontology by focusing on the hermeneutics of Heidegger. Based on 
his works, which consider the understanding as a way of being and therefore offering 
the foundation for all knowledge, this study will underline the decisive shift concerning 
the question of being (l’être) in the works of modern hermeneutics fathers. 
 
 
A critical move made by Heidegger's philosophical perspective underlines the 
epistemology of understanding. The question of the ontology of understanding is 
investigated differently from his predecessors Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and 
culminates in a revolution in hermeneutics.  The understanding is not knowledge, but 
a behavioural Dasein. His main contribution to hermeneutics consists of 
subordinating the methodological and epistemological questions to the ontological 
ones. The problem of understanding is no longer linked to “other” but is extended to 
the world. There is therefore a mundanisation of understanding, which overlaps its 
depsychologisation. Understanding is a mode of being of Dasein that extends in 
interpretation, which leads to language. The interpretation is only a development 
of understanding, which is articulated in language. The phenomenological method 
and critical analysis are used for this investigation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This chapter is a brief that gives us the framework of this dissertation. This section 
served as the general introduction and is divided in eight sub-sections: Background 
and motivation, research   problematic, research   hypothesis, literature review, 
theoretical framework, subject limit, outline of chapters and research delimitation. 
1.2  Background and Motivation 
Before embarking on the revalidation of the question of being in the history of 
philosophy the first task should be to clarify the prejudices that weigh on the meaning 
of being throughout the history of Western metaphysics. The second task should be to 
clarify the hiddenness of the question of being on the one hand and on the other hand, 
to demonstrate the imperativeness of its repetition. For Heidegger, the concept "being" 
is the broadest and most empty word (Heidegger, 1992: 25), and therefore difficult to 
define. This difficulty derives from the following three assumptions: 
 
• Being is a very general concept. The agreement about it is every time 
already included in everything. The generality of the "being" overcomes 
any generic generality. The concept "being" is the more obscure; 
• The concept "being" is indefinable. This concluded its supreme 
generality. 
 
The inability to define being does not exempt us from questioning 
its meaning. And its indefiniteness leads imperatively to the fact that; 
• Being is the self-evident concept. This common intelligibility 
demonstrates nothing other than unintelligibility. The latter brings to light 
the fact that any and every attitude compared to being is a puzzle a priori 
(Heidegger, 1992: 
27). 
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Given the above, it is now important to analyse the concept of being through the entire 
history of metaphysics. However, the basic observation is that the concept of being 
has never been thought of in its truth, not only because philosophers have asked 
the question and poorly developed it, but also because being does not manifest itself: 
it is revealed or never reveals that veiling (Hottois, 2002: 344). It should be noted here 
that the quintessential philosophical misunderstanding is the confusion of being 
(l’être) and of being (l’étant). Metaphysics or the history of philosophy erred in thinking 
of being as being exclusively. In other words, the being was to swallow being 
(Heidegger, 1992: 51). 
 
 
 
Martin Heidegger considers any subsequent ontology as monstrous outgrowth stuffy 
truths, which occurred in the early days. Ontology, he says, has been trivialised. In 
his opinion, the greatest responsibility is to the account of scholasticism. Indeed, the 
first Greek philosophers had already paved the way for their own humiliation since the 
initial deviations appear in the same works of those who created the metaphysics 
(Heidegger, 1992: 3). For Heidegger, though there have been some glimmers of truth 
at the beginning of philosophical thought. This error culminated at the beginning of 
modernity with Descartes, and after with Nietzsche and reaches its decline in 
technology. Peter Critchley affirmed all this in his own way: 
 
 
Heidegger is concerned to discover precisely when and how human 
beings lost touch with being. Heidegger reveals that the loss of being 
in the modern world has its origins not in the Weberian process 
of modernisation and rationalisation but in the way that Western 
civilisation has conceived reason since classical times. Praising 
the pre-Socratics, Heidegger makes the challenging criticism that the 
Western philosophy has been on the wrong path since Plato 
(Critchley, 2004: 2). 
 
 
In its idealistic realism, Plato identifies being with ideas. These are what is more real, 
more being. Thus, being is wrongly identified with essential shapes, whose essential 
characteristics are visibility and permanence, in short the eternal presence. In another 
development language, in Plato’s view, truth is the ideal, that is to say, being as visible 
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to the intellect. The real is the visible, the important thing is to perceive what is revealed 
and if the real is ideal, the truth of thought is the orthotes, the fact of seeing correctly 
and reflecting this report in the proposal, which thus, is true in so far as it is consistent 
with what occurs (Vattimo, 1985: 98). Plato thought the other of matter and the 
sensible, but not the other of any being. Thus, by not seeking the being as such, but 
the being of being, Plato established a hierarchy of beings. We have in the foreground 
beings as essential ideals that give material things a little stability and reality (Hottois, 
2002: 346). 
 
 
On the other hand, Aristotle considers being in both directions, it is first seen as what 
(eidos), that is to say essence and then as that (ousia), that is to say effective existence. 
The latter is for him energy in act, and it is effectively the act of existing. He attributes 
the first way to being, not essence or eidos (Vattimo, 1985: 99). This treatment of 
energeia ties Aristotle to the origin of the concept of alethia insofar as thinking being 
as act, thinking as the end point of a process and therefore as a coming from. 
Furthermore, the fact that energeia is separate from the eidos or essence means that 
the Aristotelian position is a step closer to the ever more complete identification of 
being with what is effectively present (Heidegger, 1992: 51). 
 
 
In the Middle Ages (Heidegger, 1992: 26) the question was not why being is such, 
but why it is a set, that is to say why it exists as such. Reasoning thus, the medieval 
philosophers are led to discover the supreme essence: he that is in the Bible. This 
esse, designed as immutable (St. Augustine) or as superessentialis (Denys the 
Areopagite). Nevertheless, with Thomas Aquinas, one can no longer say that it is 
an object because it is a being; we must now reverse the proposal. It is an ens only 
in so far as it refers to the esse; ens means habens esse. That is why; St. Thomas 
Aquinas directs the question of being toward being supremely eminent: ipsum esse of 
God, and breaks at the same time with the Greek question of being understood as 
toti eneinai. The question now applies to a being whose being grows its roots beyond 
the simple quiddity to the pure act of existing (Jacob, 1990: 89-90). 
 
 
Descartes was the first philosopher to be critical of the whole process that considers 
all implied implications of the Greek conception of being as idea (Plato) and as 
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energeia (Aristotle). The Greek word "idea" has the same root as the verb "to see" that 
means to be effectively present. The true being has as a fundamental feature the 
fact of giving itself as certain. The constitutive feature of being is the certainty, the 
peremptory nature of what is indubitable (Vattimo, 1985: 99). Indeed, the Cartesian 
shift is that of modernity, but it is a continuation of the Platonic reduction of being to 
beings a crucially important point of Heidegger’s. Cartesian philosophy is 
characterized by the primacy of the subject that becomes the Supreme Being, the 
ultimate foundation of all other beings treated as objects. It is in this sense, that in 
seeking the truth, the human being is only certain of two realities: 
 
• His own as ego cogitans (the unmistakable certainty of cogito); 
 
• Its own representations. This is what he raises before him in thought. The clear 
and obvious representations are therefore the only objective because they are 
what the ego cogitans extraposes. It is about what he apprehends directly and 
what he can be sure of (Heidegger, 1992: 50). 
 
 
With this Cartesian transformation that is far from a simple story of words and thinking, 
the absolute and unshakable foundation of reality is now the human self before which 
everything should legitimize the being of things, which is not recognised simply to the 
extent that it is certain. 
 
 
Moreover, that the notion of objectivity of which modern philosophy makes so much 
use is always correlative to that of the thinking subject. The objective reality is that 
which manifests itself to the subject thinking that it is. The objective reality is 
constituted by the certainty that the subject thinking has (Vattimo, 1985: 100). This 
desire for certainty characteristic of modernity is associated with the development of 
analytical thinking, calculative, and methodical that quantifies and measures 
everything. In this context, mathematics is very important for the development of an 
ensured knowledge, which will be deployed as the modern science. This knowledge 
is a sure guarantee also for the effective presence of the subject in mid-being or 
among beings. Therefore, the Cartesian subject is the one who controls all of nature 
and dominates it through science and technology.  
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However, despite the fact that in Descartes’ view the true God ensures the fit between 
my obvious representations and the laws of nature, certainty on or about the true 
god 
is founded in the idea of evidence I have such a god. The thinking subject is, in fact, 
regarded as the ultimate foundation of all truth and all reality (Heidegger, 1992: 50). 
 
 
Given all the above, the thinking subject, from the Cartesian reduction of the "being 
true" to the certainty of the thinking subject is a reduction of things to oneself, a 
reduction that has the sense of possession. At the end of this process, being’s 
reduction to certainty is its reduction to the will of the thinking subject. 
 
 
In the opinion of Gilbert Hottois, the great metaphysical systems of the nineteenth 
century, mainly those of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, could not have been conceived 
without the existence of the thinking subject animated by the desire to reduce 
everything to one's self, and the shape of the system as a reduction of the real to a 
single principle could arise in that time when the ego cogitans was conceived as the 
will to reduce the whole of being to oneself (Hottois, 2002: 101). 
 
 
Moreover, it is in this context that modern philosophy is called a philosophy of 
subjectivity, anthropocentrism. The radical assurance that the subject acquires is in 
theory of knowledge, that is to say, a technique increasingly powerful, making the 
human being master and possessor of nature and morals; the human being is free, 
he is the source and foundation of all values and laws. 
 
 
Cartesian philosophy does not establish the dualism between becoming (devenir) 
and eternity as did Plato, but between human being, the thinking subject and free, 
and all the rest of being. This is the dualism between subject and object. 
 
 
Kant, following Descartes, ignored the question of being because he lacked a thematic 
ontology of Dasein and a prior ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject. 
Therefore, he simply repeated dogmatically Cartesian views though revising some 
(Heidegger, 1992: 50). Just like all the philosophers that we have mentioned, 
Nietzsche is the one who completes the history of Western metaphysics by deepening 
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the oblivion of the question of being (Heidegger, 1978: 347). We have also the same 
tune from Vattimo. According to the latter, metaphysics comes to an end in 
Nietzsche because 
he presents himself as the first true nihilist and the deepest essence of metaphysics 
is precisely nihilism: "The history of nihilism is that of being himself and this story is 
precisely that of metaphysics as forgetfulness of Being which hardens more and more" 
(Vattimo 1985: 97). 
 
With Nietzsche, there is no longer that of beings. Only the totality of beings is still 
considered. This contemporary nihilism homogenized being, and anything goes 
and nothing is valuable in itself. This radical homogenisation consumes the 
forgetfulness of forgetting, the ontological difference is present in philosophy since its 
origin and culminates in contemporary nihilism. Indeed, temporalisation is not to think 
about the internal relationship between time and being. It amounts to only consider 
the fact that man is conceived of as an unlimited process devoid of any meaning and 
purpose (Heidegger, 1985: 376). It is noted that the totality of beings in the infinite 
process of time is nothing other than the expression of the will to power in the sense 
of creativity, productivity, incessant form and content. This will to power is not only 
the being of being, of nature, but also of human being, in short, of the subject. 
 
 
Since having no purpose beyond itself, the will to power pursues its own development, 
its infinite growth. A product of the will to power, man has become the subject of that 
will. Now it is man who invents goals and values from a radical freedom or spontaneity. 
The nihilist human being or the Nietzschean human being continues to reinterpret 
being, to work it, to operate it, to destroy it, store it, and create new forms and new 
content. 
 
 
From this moment, all the goals, all values now appear without reason or necessity, 
posed by human subjectivity. It is the reign of relativism and decisionism, morality 
and worldviews without any foundation other than the contingent and irrational act 
that establishes an ephemeral way (Hottois, 2002: 349). Having as a concern the 
development of power being always more updated and with new possibilities, a 
human  
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being is particularly concerned about his survival, a necessary condition for further 
deployment of his power. That is why an individual person seeks to master and 
control nature. 
Thus, science and technology appear as the preferred means of his human will to 
power that understands the truth as efficiency, thought as calculation and the real as 
an infinitely operable and usable material. 
 
 
In fact, Nietzschean nihilism is well suited to the description of the twentieth century 
under the label of techno-science that is seen by Heidegger as the culmination of 
metaphysics and so in this way as the ultimate stage in the history of being (Heidegger, 
1968: 237). As mentioned above, the technique is, in the opinion of Gianni Vattimo, 
precisely the phenomenon that man, in terms of living in the world, expresses the 
deployment and completion of metaphysics. The exclusive donation of being as 
theorised will by Nietzsche – extreme concealment of being in favour of beings, is 
the modern technique that gives the world the form of what we now call the total 
organisation (Vattimo, 1985: 103). The technique performs the last step in the 
elimination of any residual difference between true reality and empirical reality. Once 
the ontological difference is eliminated the last pale memory of that difference is also 
eliminated. Of being itself, there is nothing left, except the beings. The being of beings 
is totally and exclusively being made by the will of the producer and organizer. It is 
understood, that for Heidegger metaphysics is the completed technique, which leads 
to the holistic abusive exploitation of the world (Heidegger, 1968: 237). 
 
 
Indeed, the livelihood of metaphysics can only be possible when it forgets his or her 
oblivion (Heidegger, 1985: 89). Noticing forgetfulness begs a crucial question, which 
in essence, is the one formulated in slightly different terms in the last paragraph of 
Being and Time, by asking why the being of being could come to be thought of 
as mere presence (Heidegger, 1992: 263). Here, the issue took a more radical turn 
historically: how has it been possible to get to the point of complete oblivion of being, 
at which we find ourselves? This is where reflection on metaphysics as history is a 
necessary project of the sense of being that is not metaphysical. It is clear, indeed, 
that the perception of oblivion already implies a position, which in embryonic form, is 
no longer in this oversight. 
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It is simple to understand metaphysics as history and out of it, being in a different 
sense. Hence, the significance is not only negative destruction of the history of 
ontology; 
but it is still positive as the development of a new project of the sense of being, one 
that leads Heidegger to reflect on the history of metaphysics (Heidegger, 1992: 263-
264). 
 
 
It is mainly because of this shift that we became interested in Heidegger's project. 
Our interest in the work of the German philosopher Heidegger is justified as far as it 
develops a renewed philosophy and satisfactory understanding of Dasein, which is 
an ontological modality, on which all knowledge is grafted. A balanced assessment 
would give credit to Heidegger for having rehabilitated the structure of pre-
understanding, which is often regarded as an obstacle to knowledge. To the German 
philosopher Heidegger should go the credit for having shown clearly that the 
ontological problem precedes the epistemological problem because the latter (the 
epistemological problem) is based on the ontological problem. In other words, 
Heidegger restores the primacy of understanding over knowledge and clearly shows 
that all knowledge has its foundation in understanding as the mode of being of 
Dasein. 
 
1.3  Research problematic and objectives 
The primary concern of Heidegger's work is the question of being. This question 
crosses, so to speak, the whole history of philosophy from its origins until today. The 
concept of being, it is said, is not only the most ambiguous, but also the broadest 
one in philosophy (Heidegger, 1992: 25). Heidegger's concern is precisely why the 
metaphysicians have watered down the question of being which nevertheless served 
as their guideline. This forgetting of being in the history of philosophy has had 
enormous consequences on existential and ethical levels. From this perspective, all 
beings have undergone excessive machinations, including Dasein. The human being 
was reduced to the level of things, that is to say objectified, reified. This confusion of 
being (être) with being (étant) allowed science to make significant progress as far as 
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threatening the balance of the universe. We think here lies the beginning of the 
environmental problem, cloning of the problem and even human cloning. 
 
 
Therefore, by questioning   the   being   of   Dasein, in contrast   to   Dilthey   and  
 
Schleiermacher, Heidegger proposes to clarify human ontological status as the 
ground, 
on which knowledge is based. We note in Heidegger’s work a passage shift from 
epistemology to ontology of understanding. This is the great revolution that he 
operates in hermeneutics. Drawing on Heidegger's intuitions, our effort in this 
reflection is to give back to mankind his primacy in the universe. In view of the 
ontological understanding, we realise that the problem of understanding, which was 
once thought to be related to the problem of the other, now proves to be completely 
released from it, because it is linked to the problem of the world. Indeed, Heidegger 
mundanises understanding to become the mode of being of Dasein and not of 
knowledge, in contrast to Schleiermacher and Dilthey (Heidegger 1992: 143). Put 
another way, we can consider that the ontological understanding is itself, vigilance of 
Dasein. 
 
 
As a result, we see that the world's problems are the same that concern Dasein to the 
highest degree. Dasein must be attentive not only to the world's equilibrium, but it must 
also make its necessary harmony in space and in time. It is from here that we draw the 
existential issues of the ontological understanding. It should be noted that in 
Heidegger’s view, understanding is also meant to apply (Grondin, 1999:154), in other 
words, an understanding that is in fact what we would like to see apply to the 
spatiotemporal context, to the system, to the group, etc. An understanding without 
application is a contradiction. It is not a mechanical process, not a matter of rules, or 
even a procedure, but a capacity, know-being and a fineness of spirit (Jacob, 1999). 
 
 
When we say that the work was done with "application" in French, it also means that 
it was executed with dedication and diligence. It is noted that this practical aspect of 
understanding is undoubtedly an Aristotelian heritage (Grondin, 1999: 155). This 
understanding is not theoretical knowledge, but above all practical, in other words, 
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an ethos. This understanding as knowing how to be good is to apply in a specific 
situation. Such is the thesis that cements and spices our intellectual effort in this work. 
 
 
To better exploit it, we will remain in the phenomenological perspective that will be 
complemented by a critical analysis. The phenomenological method will be useful 
because our first task will be to explain this turning point operated by Heidegger and 
to demonstrate its existential and ethical significance, before analyzing it. 
 
1.4  Research Hypothesis 
We are in a society where epistemology was favoured, based on its foundation. Any 
philosophy before Heidegger was the consecration of knowledge and the 
concealment of ontology. However, with Heidegger, there is a total reversal: the 
German philosopher makes us understand that a house cannot stand without a 
foundation. 
 
 
From the above, we argue that there is a primacy of ontology over epistemology in 
the sense that all epistemological problems first go through ontology, which is the 
ground on which all knowledge must be based. In short, understanding the meaning 
of knowledge comes second compared to understanding as ontological modality. 
This is understood more easily in a child who speaks a language before having 
analyzed it. For Dasein, understanding is the mode of being on which all knowledge 
can be grafted. 
And openness to the world of Dasein, in the form of “in order to,” on the one hand and, 
on the other hand, meaningfulness of the world, constitutes understanding as the 
existential condition of possibility of any other mode of knowing. It is in this sense that 
we should understand Heidegger's understanding of being as a power-being that is 
at the same time a having-been-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-gewesensein) (Heidegger, 
1980: 394). 
 
 
 
The Heideggerian understanding is original and different from the ordinary meaning 
of this word that relates to the ontic. The knowledge in question here is not to be 
reduced to a purely conceptual understanding, since in considering the world as 
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a possible meaningfulness, this sense of understanding is having-been (savoir-
être) as being used, served or harmed. This understanding is not theoretical because 
this is a mode, which is both simpler and more original than understanding 
encompassed by simply entering a being as something such as a hammer to nail 
tool (Heidegger, 1985). We will have to analyze, in this section, understanding as a 
worrisome pursuit of Dasein, and understanding as understanding and attitudes for 
all the existential dimensions. This is the main thesis that runs through this research. 
 
1.5  Literature Review 
In the light of philosophy, we have the question of being, its concealment and its 
consequences at the centre of research in philosophy. Nevertheless, with reference 
to what concerns us, we will mention some leading figures who have discussed the 
issue of the turning point operated by Heidegger in the philosophical hermeneutics 
before us, to demonstrate its relevance and timeliness in philosophy. Before 
mentioning Heidegger, we will start with the two fathers of modern hermeneutics: 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey. For them, understanding is a cognitive mode. 
 
 
Commenting on Schleiermacher, Berner says that in all the writings of Schleiermacher 
hermeneutics is defined as the art of understanding, meaning that all production made 
by art in which we are aware of the general rules, the particular application of the 
interpretation cannot be reduced to rules (Berner, 1995: 49). For Schleiermacher, the 
object of hermeneutics is essentially discourse, no matter whether oral or written. It 
is therefore hermeneutic wherever there is a thought that is expressed by speech, or 
thought expressed in the sign. Many commentators argue that the aim of 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is about understanding, although Gadamer thinks 
the Schleiermacherian hermeneutics would not understand the objective meaning of 
speech, but would grasp the individuality of the speaker or author (Gadamer, 1976: 
191). Whether from the position of Berner or that of Gadamer, understanding remains 
the target of the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher. Comprehension is a psychological 
reconstruction that seeks to rediscover the creative process in its main expressive 
dimension (Berner, 1995: 69). 
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However, for Gadamer, understanding, in Schleiermacher, is a transposition in the 
disposition of the writer, seizure of the internal production of a work process, a 
reconstruction of the creative act. In order to understand this, we must return to the 
seminal point of departure of the individual perspective in which the general production 
is anchored. This goes to the starting point of speech (Gadamer, 1976: 189). That is 
why hermeneutics in Schleiermacher’s view remains an art as long as the problem 
of understanding remains riveted to the problem of individuality. The hermeneutical 
problem in Schleiermacher’s work is to understand the thought in its claim to 
universality even as it is inscribed in an individual subject. Therefore, to understand 
is to marry the conviction of the writer and the perspective from which an author 
meant something. The understanding here is ‘intropathique’, that is to say, 
understanding what is going into the feeling of the author to grasp what he is meaning 
(Kangudi). Additionally, understanding attempts to move from the exteriority of the 
utterance to the internal first- person perspective of the speaker or writer (Nelson, 
2010: 13). 
 
 
The point of departure of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is the misunderstanding or 
non-understanding, which is caused by hastiness or prejudice (Nelson, 2010: 4). In 
other words, hermeneutics is based on the fact of non-understanding of speech 
(Berner, 1995; Ricoeur, 1986). 
 
For Dilthey, it is important, from the outset to clarify that there is a distinction between 
the natural sciences and the sciences of the mind. To this awareness there is grafted 
the need to produce a distinction between the realm of nature and that of history. 
Dilthey’s hermeneutics is, in fact, developing a proper epistemology of historical 
sciences. In fact, the human being is understood as freedom, as opposed to the 
rest of nature, which is governed by determinism. The human being highlights this 
demarcation when he thinks of his being as life or spirit (Mesure, 1990: 96). 
 
Habermas, commenting on Dilthey, thinks the difference between the natural 
sciences and those of the mind must be reduced to the orientation of the researcher, 
his attitude towards objects. This difference is located in objectification. It is in this 
sense, that we approach nature as a world phenomenon obeying general laws, 
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eliminating the experience of the researcher (Habermas, 1976: 177). In the sciences 
of the mind, Habermas believes that concepts and theoretical approaches are 
mimetic reconstructions. To this researcher’s way of thinking, in the natural sciences, 
knowledge leads to theories or individual nomological statements, which have been 
confirmed by experience, while the theories and the requirements of sciences of the 
spirit serve merely as a vehicle for the production of a lived experience breeder 
(Habermas, 1976: 179). 
 
It appears that the demarcation perceived in this sense is an epistemology of historical 
knowledge. Here there is an opening in the tradition of critical philosophies of history 
and the need to give priority to the acquisition of historical knowledge, while not denying 
the history and general science of spirit of their legitimate explanatory dimension. In 
view of the above, Makkreel considers the philosophy of Dilthey as ‘psychologist’ 
because of the fact that the mind sciences are based on psychology and that for 
Dilthey, epistemology and psychology go together and cannot be separated from 
each other (Mesure, 1990: 111). For Heidegger, understanding is still coloured by 
feeling, that is to say, understanding is co-born with affection (Heidegger, 1992). As 
emphasized by Jean Greisch (2000: 187): "In reality, affection has always been a form 
of understanding and conversely, all understanding is affected". 
 
 
Understanding is a mode of being of Dasein, or rather the fundamental mode of Dasein. 
This is a primary understanding, which is the very structure of Dasein in its presence 
in the world so that with Heidegger, we pass from an epistemological vision of 
understanding to an existential vision, on which he intends to base the original concept 
of understanding. Understanding, for Heidegger, is open to the world. It is important to 
remember that understanding as opening is not cognitive understanding as it is in the 
sciences of the mind. It is a more original understanding that goes with existence as 
opening. Understanding is also a mode of being that constantly projects Dasein to its 
possibilities. This is what Heidegger says in these words: "The understanding is itself 
the existential structure we call the project" (Heidegger, 1992: 145). 
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Understanding projects the being of Dasein. Dasein is constantly projected in its 
possibilities because it is open. Incidentally, all understanding culminates in the 
description of the explanation. Without explanation, understanding remains 
incomplete. In the explanation, states Heidegger: "understanding appropriates 
comprehensibly what it understands. In the explanation, understanding does not 
become something else but itself"(Heidegger, 1992: 148). 
 
1.6  Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
It should further noted that it is under its hermeneutical dimension, that is to say the 
analytic of existence, that we will focus our discussion on understanding. In order to 
identify the nature of the problem studied, our analysis requires consideration of some 
methods for its development. Indeed, in this research the analytic-descriptive method 
helps us to trace the evolutionary path of understanding. We incorporate the 
phenomenological perspective that is complemented by a critical analysis. Our task 
is firstly, by means of the phenomenological method, to clarify and understand the 
turning point operated by Heidegger in hermeneutics, and, secondly, by means of 
critical analysis, to assess its direct and indirect criticism and to draw out the ethical 
consequences hereby. 
 
 
1.7  Subject Limit 
Indeed, the question of being in philosophy serves as a guideline for all philosophy, 
from its beginning until today. Heidegger tries to pull the question of the meaning of 
being out of the oblivion into which it is immersed, not to pursue the ontological or 
metaphysical debate initiated by tradition, but to return to the "things themselves" of 
philosophy. Sein und Zeit proposes a development of philosophy understood as 
questioning the meaning of being (Heidegger, 1992). 
 
1.8  Outline of Chapters 
Our research includes four chapters. The first chapter is a general introduction. The 
second (Epistemology of understanding) deals with understanding as knowledge and 
is based on the work of two fathers of modern hermeneutics: Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey. The third chapter focuses on the question of being. We look closely at the 
evolution of this issue in philosophy from Parmenides to Heidegger. In other words, 
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it shows how being (être) was obscured in favour of beings (étant). It is essentially 
the question of being overshadowed by traditional metaphysics, by delineating only 
as a single-presence, beings (Etant). 
 
The analysis of chapters two and three serves as a springboard to the fourth 
(Ontological understanding).  In this final chapter, Heidegger comes to show the 
subordination of the theory of understanding, understood as knowledge, to the 
ontological question of understanding. Understanding here is the mode of being of 
Dasein, the ground on which all knowledge is based. The problem of understanding 
that was once linked to the “other” is completely freed from him, because it goes 
together with the problem of the world. Heidegger mundanises understanding, which 
therefore becomes a mode of being (of Dasein) and not of knowledge as in the case 
of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. 
1.9 Research Delimitations and Research Ethics 
 
With epistemological hermeneutics and the occultation of the question of being (être) 
in favour of the question of being (étant), everything was under human being, who used 
it as he pleased, so that we come to a pre-determined, and hence biased, knowledge 
of this being (étant). Everything was being and as such easier to manipulate. 
However, with the ontological turn and the ontological primacy Dasein has over other 
beings (étant), rapport with beings must be with all respect, and the goal that guides 
all human interactions with nature must be the well-being of Dasein. From here, we 
can even lay the foundations for an environmental ethic that would be the subject of 
further research. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
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EPISTEMOLOGY OF UNDERSTANDING 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter mainly focuses on human beings’ understanding and the world in which 
they are   dwelling.   The   hermeneutics   of   understanding   as   developed   by 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey are discussed. Firstly, a description of understanding 
according to Schleiermarcher is given. Secondly, hermeneutics as developed by 
Dilthey is discussed, based on his thinking about the science of nature and the science 
of mind. The relevance of this chapter is to link and to lead to the originality of 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics of understanding. 
 
2.2  The object and aim of Schleiermacherian hermeneutics  
Commenting on Schleiermacher, Berner asserts that in all Schleiermacher’s work, 
hermeneutics is defined as the art of understanding (Berner, 1995: 49). By art, 
we mean all composite production in the course of which we are aware of the 
general rules, whose particular application can no longer be reduced to rules 
(Berner, 1995: 
49). It should be pointed out in passing that Schleiermacher called for a general 
hermeneutics, the reason being that in his time hermeneutics was dispersed in special 
disciplines, especially in classical philology and biblical exegesis. Then, what and 
why should we interpret from Schleiermacher's perspective? 
 
2.2.1  The object of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics 
From Schleiermacher’s perspective, the object of hermeneutics is essentially 
discourse, which may be oral or written. In 1829, Schleiermacher defined 
interpretation as an artistic activity that consists of any understanding of another 
person's speech. The notion of otherness does not only mean the foreign language 
or passages which, in my own language, require a translation, since in every 
discourse there is, even in that which we seem to understand, something that one 
does not understand. We must understand the thought immediately oriented towards 
exposure, that is, the discourse, which is the object of hermeneutics. Nevertheless, 
exhibitions of another kind, which do not start from thought, have a quite different 
function, situated outside the field of hermeneutics (Berner, 1995: 50). There is, 
therefore, hermeneutics wherever there is a thought which is expressed by a 
discourse, which is nothing else than all thought which expresses itself in the sign. 
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In Schleiermacher's view, the work of art is not, as such, the object of hermeneutics. 
The art of understanding has as its object all discourses, which convey content 
and which communicate. In the writing of 1819, there is a very clear formula which 
states: “every act of discourse is not an object of interpretation to an equal degree: 
some objects have a zero value for this art, others have an absolute value, most are 
between these two extremes” (Berner, 1995: 51). 
 
 
Thus, speeches, which content themselves with maintaining the language in the 
continuity of repetition have a zero value. Interpretation is only triggered by elaborate 
thought and its purpose is to develop it. Indeed, general hermeneutics is understood 
only with the dialectic which is nothing else than the art of the combination of thoughts 
and the rhetoric, which is that of their shaping because it (general hermeneutics) is 
dealing with thought. 
 
 
The art of understanding is required whenever it comes to perceiving, through words, 
ideas or series of ideas. Ideas and thought are the objects of the art of understanding 
only insofar as they are the products of intellectual functions. Hermeneutics applies 
only to conversations cultivated with the most spiritual people, with whom significant 
conversations are engaged. In this sense, a chat does not call for the art of 
understanding (Berner, 1995: 52). Since we must understand the thoughts 
expressed 
in discourse and formulated in a language, hermeneutics, which has the sole task of 
understanding discourse, then has language as the only presupposition. In 
Schleiermacher’s view, thoughts are not considered as mere data, but as realities 
produced that must be re-energized in a concrete self. 
 
 
There is no speech without the will to communicate, and therefore to be understood. 
The discourse, which is the object of hermeneutics is in fact the discourse which has 
a conceptual content, that is, which makes possible the exchange, the transmission 
of meaning. Authentic discourse is a will to be understood. Discourse is that 
movement, which starting from itself, is directed towards the other, and ideas, which 
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have never been merely objectivations must in their crystallization be referred them 
to a subject, to an individual who produced them. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 The aim of hermeneutics 
Many of Schleiermacher's commentators assert that the purpose of his hermeneutics 
is understanding (Berner, 1995: 50), although Gadamer thinks that the aim of 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is not at all to understand the objective meaning 
of discourse but to grasp the individuality of the speaker or author (Gadamer, 
1996: 
189). Whether we accept Berner's or Gadamer's position, understanding remains the 
aim of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. However, what does Schleiermacher mean 
by understanding? To understand is to reconstruct the work (discourse) as a living 
act of the author. In other words, understanding is a psychological reconstruction that 
seeks to rediscover the creative process in its mainly expressive dimension. Besides, 
according to Berner's commentary on Dilthey, Schleiermacher's particularity is that 
he insisted on the living aspect of understanding, that is, the reconstruction that can 
rely only on the living relationship with the process of production (Berner, 1995: 12). 
Understanding a discourse means understanding the living intuition of the creative 
process. Here we must find psychologically the living association of thoughts. 
 
 
According to Gadamer, Schleiermacher's understanding would be "a transposition 
into the writer's disposition, a grasp of the internal process of the realization of a work, 
a reconstruction of the creative act" (Gadamer, 1996: 191). Indeed, to understand 
is a question of returning to the seminal decision, to the absolutely individual aspect 
in which the general production is anchored. It is therefore a question of going to the 
origin of the discourse. In the same way, Margolis states: 
 
Schleiermacher's achievement, stated in the homeliest way, centers on 
the fact that he was convinced (and pursued the conviction) that man must 
be capable of understanding his fellow (as he understands himself) and 
that this ability (which may well lend itself to discipline, improvement, 
system, and variable talent and skill) must be the common, accessible 
property of humanity (Margolis, 1987: 362). 
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It is worth pointing out here that it is by referring to genius in creation that it is possible 
to account for the necessity of the divinatory character of interpretation. This is why 
hermeneutics, in Schleiermacher’s view, will remain an art as long as the problem of 
understanding remains attached to the problem of individuality. The concern of 
Schleiermacher's hermeneutics is to understand thought in its claim to universality 
even though it is inscribed in an individual subject. Hermeneutics is thus, found in 
this double movement of constitution of the individual and the universal. 
 
 
Consequently, to understand is to embrace the conviction of the writer and to be able 
to grasp the perspective from which an author wanted to say something. 
Understanding is therefore here intropathic. Further to understand is to enter into the 
author's feeling, to grasp what he meant. Hence, understood in this light, 
understanding will remain relatively and always imperfect. This is well rendered, in 
the Latin phrase: "individuum est ineffabile" (Berner, 1995: 13). 
 
 
According to Berner, understanding what is at stake in hermeneutics means 
understanding how an individual works in the language, collaborates, and gives 
meaning to concepts. Hermeneutics thus tackles the individual constitution of 
concepts. In other words, it is a matter of seeing in hermeneutics how, starting from 
the individual, thought can establish something new through the detour of the linguistic 
medium and its general structural conditions (Berner, 1995: 55). 
 
 
Indeed, according to Schleiermacher, thought is considered as a model of 
understanding. This explains, moreover, the generality of Schleiermacher’ 
hermeneutics which does not mean that this hermeneutics applies to a large number 
of objects, as Manfred Frank rightly asserts, but to that universal object which is the 
thought in itself. Individual thought is always enlightened in the light of the universal 
(Berner, 1995: 55). However, from the ethical point of view, hermeneutics is 
understood in Schleiermacher’s sense as a science of the becoming of the spirit, a 
speculative science of the action of reason on nature. To understand is really an 
enrichment of the self of the interpreter, a process of spiritualization, the realization 
of reason (Berner,1995: 55). 
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2.3  The Lack of Understanding and the Will to Understand 
The starting point of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is not understanding but the lack 
of understanding. In other words, hermeneutics is based on the lack of understanding. 
This idea is very well formulated by Berner, commenting on Schleiermacher in these 
terms: “Hermeneutics rests on the factum of the non-understanding of discourse” 
(Berner, 1995: 56). This same idea is also supported by Paul Ricoeur, who rightly 
points out that it is the fact of misunderstanding that gave rise to hermeneutics in 
general (Ricoeur, 1984: 325). Schleiermacher notes three stages of hermeneutics, 
which are, pure non-understanding, misunderstanding and comprehension. 
 
Integral comprehension is the transparency of thought to itself, since the thought of 
the individual finds its correspondence with the essence of thought and is nothing 
other than the thinking mind, which is gradually discovering itself. In this sense, 
in a real dialogue, there is an essential dimension of communion or community by 
virtue of the fact that it is the other that I understand by grasping its expressions. It is 
then easy to understand that hermeneutics is inscribed only in a community of 
communication that presupposes a community of language (Berner, 1995: 56). On 
the other hand, misunderstanding does not awaken the will to understand because, 
first, it has meaning only on the horizon of it (the will to understand). It is the former 
(misunderstanding) that is at the point of departure of the error of understanding, 
because the consciousness of the error of understanding does not help us to situate 
the origin and its essence. 
 
 
This awareness does not help us to remedy this misunderstanding which often results 
from past negligence and its awareness is not a guarantee of good hermeneutics. 
Berner, commenting on Schleiermacher, states that in 1809, for the latter, the 
hermeneutic operation must not only begin where understanding becomes uncertain, 
for usually, when it becomes so, it has already been neglected earlier (Berner, 1995: 
57). From the outset, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics is a manifestation of the will to 
understand. It is in this sense that the hermeneutic operation begins at the very 
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beginning of the undertaking of trying to understand a discourse. Indeed, it is essential 
to realise that misunderstanding cannot be a reality, a given, because, if it is total, then 
it cannot be linked to it (hermeneutics) by any means. Misunderstanding becomes 
here a necessary passage, that is, to want to understand a discourse, it is to act from 
the start as if I did not understand it because in hermeneutics, there is no immediate 
understanding or clarity. It should be noted that ordinary and practical understanding 
existed before Schleiermacher, who thinks that the interest of general hermeneutics 
is a theoretical interest which is reflected at the level of reflection, and consequently 
that immediate understanding has hermeneutic status only when it is reflected 
(Berner,1995: 58). 
 
 
As a continuation of what has just been said, it should be noted once more that the 
more rigorous practice of hermeneutics always starts from the fact that erroneous 
understanding occurs spontaneously and that understanding must be something 
wanted and searched for point by point. Therefore, to realise that I do not understand 
is to realise that I wanted to understand (Berner, 1995: 59). Finally, to be truthful, to 
understand the thought in a discourse implies the fact that one must therefore begin 
by understanding its medium, its condition of possibility, and its completion, which is 
language. It is here that we must understand the two complementary sides of 
understanding, namely to understand in the language and to understand in the 
speaker. This idea is better rendered by Berner, commenting on Wolf and Virmond, 
saying: “this is the double polarity of the singular universal that is the language, which 
determines the distinction between grammatical interpretation and technical 
interpretation” (Berner, 1995: 39). In other words, to understand thoughts, I must 
understand the language, which enables one to complete thoughts 
(Schleiermarcher, 1997: 176), because if one does not understand the language, 
he or she does not understand the thoughts expressed in that language. 
 
2.3.1  The grammatical interpretation 
This interpretation focuses in particular on the reality of discourse by aiming at grasping 
both the words and the links that compose it. In Berner's view, in the work of 
Schleiermacher, in the order of exposition, grammatical interpretation is always 
first because language is the only thing that must be presupposed in hermeneutics 
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and all that we find must be found from the language (Berner,1995: 68). In this 
interpretation, it is a matter of returning the meaning of discourse from the sole 
language, because the latter is common to the reader and to the author. In another 
register, only the language is taken into account and the author or writer is himself or 
herself suspended. With respect to art, this side of understanding is the art of 
regaining the determined meaning of a discourse from the language and using the 
language. Moreover, it is around this angle that a community is formed which has in 
common the language, which community is communicative, that is to say, a field of 
communication in which an author, a writer and a reader or a listener may agree. 
 
We do not pass over in silence the fact that this interpretation is called objective 
because it is based on a definite object that is the language or because it concerns 
the linguistic framework that is distinct from the author. And it is also said to be 
negative in that it delimits the domain in which a proposition can receive meaning 
and thus excludes that which does not conform to the grammatical rules and which 
cannot be understood at all (Berner, 1995: 68). 
 
Moreover, this aspect of understanding aims at reconstructing the system of concepts 
specific to an individual from the system of concepts specific to a language. It 
is concerned with the presentation of meaning in language, starting from the unity 
or synthesis between the linguistic law (concept and the multiplicity of uses (intuition) 
present in the schema). It also refers to the essential unity of words which nevertheless 
never appears as such (Berner, 1995: 69). After this brief review of language as a 
medium in which a thought comes into being, we must note that the subject who speaks 
has not yet been seriously examined. 
 
 
2.3.2  Technical interpretation 
Technical interpretation is based on the force of thought, on the conatus ultimately 
rooted in the individual who imparts a proper meaning and a mark to his discourse. 
The latter being considered as produced by a subject is a produced reality, which is 
fully intelligible only from the productivity, which is its origin (Berner, 1995: 71). This 
line of thinking has as its anchor and aim the speaker, the language being for the 
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occasion forgotten. We must start from the human being to understand his or her 
discourse, since language is nothing other than the organ placed at the service of his 
or her individual subjectivity. 
 
Indeed, the essence of technical interpretation is to consider discourse not from 
language, but from the individual who constructs it, from the human being who speaks. 
There is no question here of seeing how human being receives a language of which 
he is the heir, but how he transforms it by using it, how discourse is at his service as 
that which makes it possible to affirm his individuality (Berner, 1995: 71). Contrary to 
grammatical interpretation which is objective and negative, technical interpretation is 
subjective because it seeks to access the individual interiority which leaves its trace 
but does not manifest itself as such; it is called positive because it posits something, 
that is, it is creative or productive in its reconstruction effort (Berner, 1995: 72). In other 
words, it is said to be positive because it reaches the act of thinking that produces 
discourse. 
 
Just as discovering individuality in the particularity of the exhibition is to discover its 
style, so also the whole purpose of technical interpretation must be defined as 
the perfect understanding of style. This is why in this interpretation it is an insistence 
that we must start from the seminal decision, from the act which prompted the author 
to think what he thinks as he says. The essence of the turning point consists above 
all in grasping, from the individuality of the subject, how the concatenation and 
combination of thoughts are effected, and what the subjective dynamic is which 
presides over their succession. This interpretation is not only limited to discovering 
the concatenations of thoughts but extends even to the reproduction of the 
combination of thoughts, which is nothing else than reconstruction; that is to say, 
when I pretend to understand, I must be able to reconstruct the construction of the 
other identically (Berner, 1995: 72). 
 
 
Since style is the way in which a subject communicates his thoughts, to grasp 
the author's style, one must understand the author's psychology, his personality and 
know the environment that determines him. However, there are two aims which 
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emerge from technical interpretation, namely that of finding a theme, the general unity 
which resides in the subject of the discourse and which commands it and that of 
knowing the author. For this purpose, we find two interpretations directed towards the 
individual who speaks. There is the psychological interpretation which seeks more 
particularly to account for the birth of thoughts from the element of life taken as a 
whole and thus endeavours to grasp the genesis of a discourse within a global 
moment of existence, and the technical interpretation, which consists in relating to a 
determined thought or a will to expose from, which develops thought and, which 
seeks to make intelligible the composition and the meditation which corresponds to 
the intention or the will to expose, which is at the origin of any series of thoughts. It 
should be noted that this distinction appears much later in the course of 
Schleiermacher's thinking (Berner, 1995: 72). These two types of interpretations are 
complementary and form the hermeneutic circle, which stipulates that the singular is 
understood only from the universal and vice versa. In the hermeneutics of 
Schleiermacher, there are not only the two sides of understanding or the two 
interpretations; there are also the ways that help us to carry the interpretation to good 
effect. Therefore, these are the methods. 
 
 
2.4  Methods 
Whether grammatical or technical, it does not matter; interpretation always uses two 
methods, which are divinatory and comparative. 
 
 
 
2.4.1 The divinatory method 
This is the method of immediate intuition. The divinatory method, which is sometimes 
called prophetic and which seeks to guess is more intuitive and focuses on what seems 
to escape a more discursive approach. This method aims at the seizure of what is 
individual. The interpreter takes the place of others. Berner goes on to say that "the 
divinatory method [...] consists in putting oneself, (as interpreter) as far as possible, 
in the place of the author" (Berner, 1995: 76). 
 
 
This method does not pretend to immediately deliver the truth because it is part of a 
research process and because it must await the confirmation of the comparative 
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method, and by its hypothetical character, divination, like the individual conception to 
which it is supposed to lead, is always susceptible of being rectified or modified 
(Berner, 1995: 76). 
 
2.4.2  The comparative method 
A discursive approach tries to relate the particular to the general to understand it (the 
particular). This method necessarily calls for the divinatory method and vice versa. 
It must help to confirm what has been obtained by the divinatory method (Berner, 1995: 
76). Indeed, the two methods are complementary and this complementarily aims to 
better understand the author than he has understood himself (Berner, 1995: 77) that 
is to say, seized at its peak, perfect understanding consists in better to understand 
the one who speaks something that he has not understood himself. This is 
understandable, says Berner, if we are in the perspective of the version of the 
abstract of Schleiermacher’s work. There is no question of understanding the author 
in his subjective personality, but his discourse. 
 
 
Since we do not have immediate knowledge of what is in the author's mind, we must 
try to become aware of many things that are true insofar as the author in a reflexive 
movement does not become his own reader. Moreover, even on this condition, 
the author of the discourse is not necessarily its best interpreter. In the end, 
understanding the discourse better than its author did does not mean simply making 
conscious what was unconscious, but above all, as in the matter of aesthetic criticism, 
perfecting the work by pursuing it in interpretation (Berner, 1995: 78). After this 
marathon visit to Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics, the new point of investigation will 
consider understanding as an epistemological moment in Dilthey’s thesis. 
 
 
2.5 The Diltheyan Understanding 
In this section, the discussion will be based on the concept of understanding according 
to Dilthey; it will include, respectively, the distinction between the sciences of nature 
and the sciences of the mind; and the distinction between explaining and 
understanding, and a critical appraisal. Consideration will be given to criticisms of 
Rickert and Windelband (Mesure, 1990: 141-149) of the reinterpretation of Dilthey’s 
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thought, by showing, in contrast, the novelty and the originality of understanding 
according to Heidegger’s view. 
 
2.5.1 The transcendental distinction and its scope 
From the outset, it is important to point out that it is in consciousness that there is a 
need to distinguish between the reign of nature and that of history. It is, by the way, 
an elaboration of an epistemology proper to the historical sciences. Indeed, man 
experiences freedom as opposed to the rest of nature, which is governed by 
determinism. It is this demarcation that man emphasizes when he thinks of his being 
as spirit or as life. It should be noted that the distinction between the sciences of the 
mind and the sciences of nature is not based, contrary to what has sometimes been 
believed, on the position within the realm of two distinct ontological domains. For such 
a distinction would naively and metaphysically separate the spirit and nature as two 
radically heterogeneous essences (Mesure, 1990: 96). 
 
 
For Dilthey, the autonomy of the sciences of the mind is based specifically on the 
consciousness that human being has of himself or herself. Dilthey’s reflection on the 
distinction between the natural sciences and the sciences of the mind is obviously part 
of the work of a transcendental approach (Dilthey, 1988:93). In view of Dilthey's 
passage from the metaphysical or ontological distinction to the transcendental 
distinction, it follows that: 
 
 
There is a demarcation between the reign of nature and that of history, 
and within it, in the midst of a set co-ordinated by objective necessity and 
which is nature, we see in more than a point, like a flash of light would 
shine on freedom (Dilthey, 1942: 15). 
 
 
It then becomes easy and manifest to understand that Dilthey does not intend to 
oppose spirit or history to nature, nor freedom to necessity. There is, therefore, no 
radical dualism, which opposes nature and spirit without giving rise to any possibility 
of passage from one to the other. Moreover, this starting from the historical 
phenomena, which while belonging to the reign of nature and sharing its submission to 
determinism, evokes the idea of an intentional causality or presents in a sensible way 
the idea of causality by freedom. History presents itself as a place of synthesis 
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between the two kingdoms and hence the autonomy of the sciences of the mind is 
only relative, as at the heart of the substitution of the metaphysical distinction by the 
transcendental distinction is the experience of the subject on which we are going to 
reflect in the following pages. 
 
 
Positively, internal experience makes it possible to legitimize the distinction between 
the natural sciences and the sciences of the mind. The autonomy of the sciences of 
the mind is to be inscribed at the very heart of the relation which the subject maintains 
to himself and of a purely internal experience. It thus constitutes a reflexive experience 
in which the self, isolating its internal states from the given circumstances through 
which it perceives them, concentrates its attention on processes differing from the 
external experiences connected with it by the negative fact that we do not externalize 
these processes. The very possibility of such a reflection ensures that the proper 
content of our internal sense possesses an original independence and a material of 
its own, by virtue of which, if we consider science taking such material as its object, 
independence of such a science remains indisputable (Dilthey, 1942: 18). 
 
The world of mind according to Dilthey has no common measure with the intelligible 
world of Plato or the noumenal universe because the spirit is not external to nature 
as would be a spiritual substance vis-a-vis physical substance. Nature and spirit are 
merely two points of view of a dimension of phenomenal reality which belongs, on 
the one hand, as a phenomenon to nature, understood as a whole coordinated by 
objective necessity, but on the other hand, also allows freedom to shine on it 
(Mesure, 1990: 101). There is no sudden opposition between the understanding of 
the sciences of the mind and the explanation proper to the natural sciences. 
 
 
Commenting on Dilthey, Habermas thinks that the difference between the sciences 
of nature and the sciences of the mind must be reduced to the orientation of the 
knowing subject, to his attitude towards objects. This difference is situated at the level 
of objectification. It is in this sense that we consider nature according to the way in 
which we can seize it as a world of phenomena obeying general laws, thus eliminating 
the experience of the subject (Habermas, 1976: 177). 
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In the sciences of the mind, according to Habermas, concepts and theoretical 
approaches are less artificial products than mimetic reconstructions. On the other 
hand, in the natural sciences, knowledge leads to particular nomological theories or 
statements, which have been controlled by experience, while theories and 
prescriptions of the mind sciences serve only as a vehicle for the production of a lived 
reproductive experience (Habermas, 1976: 179). It appears that the demarcation 
perceived in this sense is an epistemology of historical knowledge. Here, then, there 
is the inauguration, in the tradition of the critical philosophies of history, of the 
requirement to privilege in the acquisition of historical knowledge the understanding, 
while not depriving history and in general the sciences of Spirit of their legitimate 
explanatory dimension (Mesure, 1990: 105). 
 
Extensive criticisms of Dilthey were discussed previously.  However, how these differ 
from others thinkers such as Rickert and Windelband will be investigated in the 
following subsection. 
 
2.5.2  Critics of the Diltheyan distinction 
Dilthey’s distinction is described in two parts, namely, the outer world, nature, and 
the inner world of the mind. For Windelband, such an interpretation raises many 
difficulties and lacks   systematic   consistency.   Therefore, in   order   to   escape   
from   the nonoverlapping of the formal principle and the objective principle of 
distinction, Windelband would like us to confine ourselves to a purely methodical 
distinction based solely on the consideration of the formal character of the cognitive 
purposes. Certain sciences, in fact, seek universal laws while the others aim at 
particular historical facts. In another register of language, the aim of some is the 
general apodictic judgment, while that of others is the singular, assertoric utterance 
(Mesure, 1990: 144). 
 
 
From this point of view one would then have the sciences of experience (chemical 
science and physical science), which seek the knowledge of the real, or the universal, 
in the form of the law of nature or the singular as it appears in the historically 
determined figure. They sometimes consider the form as always identical with itself, 
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and sometimes the unique content determined in itself of the real becoming. The 
former are therefore sciences of laws, the others are sciences of events. The former 
teach what is eternal and the latter what happened once. But, to tell the truth, 
scientific thought is in one case nomothetic, and in the other idiographic. It is therefore 
permissible to speak of the opposition between the natural sciences and the historical 
sciences, on condition that we bear in mind the fact that in this methodical sense, 
psychology is entirely to be placed on the side of the natural sciences. This methodical 
opposition classifies the sciences, not from the content of knowledge, but solely from 
consideration of their treatment of their object (Mesure, 1990: 145). Psychology, by 
seeking to establish the laws of psychic life, belongs by its method to nomothetic 
disciplines, that is to say, to those, which in dedicated terminological usage; belong 
to the sciences of nature (Mesure, 1990: 145). 
 
In Rickert's view, nothing has been a greater obstacle to a clear vision of the essence 
of the historical sciences than the introduction of the opposition between physical 
and psychic processes in the logical problems of historical science (Mesure, 1990: 
147). Faced with empirical reality, the mind can adopt two epistemologically 
divergent attitudes: either it seeks out what many objects have in common, or it 
attaches to what characterises an object in its singularity. In one case, it uses the 
generalising method and in the other, an individualising method. These two types of 
knowledge, by means of which the sensible infinite can be overcome, are at the 
basis of two orders of the sciences, which Rickert calls respectively, natural sciences 
and historical sciences. These are two different ways of representing reality (Mesure, 
1990: 148). 
 
 
The natural sciences place their object under concepts, which express what the 
multitude of particular things contains in common, and which henceforth have a 
universal content. They order these concepts in such a way as to form a system of 
universal concepts, so that everything and every process that comes under their 
domain finds its place. The formal aim of knowledge is situated in the establishment 
and expression of the universal (Mesure, 1990: 148). History, on the other hand, is 
interested in what happens once only. It is not intended to represent what is offered 
everywhere and always, but rather to represent exactly, with their individual traits, 
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particular existences in the different points of space and the different moments of 
duration (Mesure, 1990: 149). 
 
 
Rickert, however, in his account of Windelband's distinction between nomothetic 
sciences and idiographical sciences, finds in this opposition between the universal 
and the particular the principle of demarcation between sciences. History, he 
believes, is the science of the individual, which happens once, as opposed to the 
natural sciences whose object is the universal, and which always appears with the 
same character (Mesure, 1990: 149). In his Critical Philosophy of History, Raymond 
Aron thinks that Rickert's distinction between natural and historical sciences has only 
a logical significance and does not correspond exactly to the sciences or to the real 
methods. Rickert's aim was not to establish a classification of the sciences, however, 
but to bring out, through the logical principle of the opposition between the universal 
and the particular, the two possible directions of scientific work (Aron, 1987: 155). 
The natural sciences all have, as matrix, mathematics. In other words, mathematics 
is the foundation of the unity of the natural sciences, but what is it of the sciences of 
the mind? 
 
2.5.3  Psychology as a foundational science of the sciences of the mind  
The great privilege that Dilthey granted to psychology is undoubtedly the most 
discussed point of his studies on the historical sciences. It is from this perspective that 
Makkreel describes Dilthey's philosophy as psychology from the facts that for Dilthey 
epistemology and psychology go hand in hand and cannot be separated from each 
other (Mesure, 1990: 111). The contestation of Dilthey's thought reaches its height 
at this level insofar as, on the basis of Husserl's logical research, psychologism, that 
is, the reduction of the question of validity to that of genesis, is considered as the 
bête noire of many epistemologists and theorists of knowledge (Mesure, 1990: 111). 
The question that deserves to be asked here is why the empowerment of the 
sciences of mind passes through psychology. But to properly answer this question 
and to fully understand Dilthey's choice of psychology, there are two important 
problems that deserve our attention. It is the essential necessity of the determination 
of a foundation for the sciences of mind and the specificity of the Diltheyan choice 
which is therefore connected with our question above. 
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2.5.3.1  The necessity of the foundation 
The demand for the foundation of the sciences of mind is imperative because of a state 
of radical dispersion. Unlike the natural sciences, which are articulated among 
themselves on the basis of mathematics, "the sciences of mind do not yet form a 
whole", and this despite the efforts of merits accomplished, in this sense by the 
attempts of Mill, Littré and Herbert Spencer to make a whole of the historical and social 
sciences (Mesure, 1990: 112). There are two reasons for this dispersion of the 
sciences of mind: a historical reason and a structural one. 
 
 
For Mesure, the sciences of mind have historically arisen in the midst of the practice 
of life and they have developed in the course of the demands of a vocational training, 
which, as a new social activity was created, made necessary the reflection of this 
activity and its own conditions. She affirms: “thus the various social sciences did 
not separate from each other by an artifice of theoretical reason which had 
undertaken to solve, by a methodical analysis of its object, the problem of fact posed 
by the world of history and Society” (Mesure, 1990: 113), but it is life itself, which 
causes these sciences to separate. Apart from historical reasons, the sciences of 
mind, for more intrinsic reasons have managed to isolate themselves from each other 
by the process of abstraction which is constitutive of their structure. “It is through an 
act of abstraction that each discipline was cutting out, so to speak, in the totality of 
reality” (Mesure, 1990: 113), a level of reading corresponding to the point of view, 
which defines it, constitutes its specific object. In this sense, every particular science 
comes into being only if one highlights the content of a fragment detached from 
historical and social reality. Each birth is accomplished as a rupture of the totality. 
 
The multiplicity of the sciences of mind is accomplished by the dispersion, which their 
history realizes. It is in this context that systematization or foundation work is 
indispensable. In fact, the sciences of mind must constitute themselves in a whole, 
not only in order to spare themselves the perverse effects of specialisation, but above 
all by sparing them a space of communication and perceiving the articulation of their 
methods and of their results. Because of the disparate or heterogeneous state in which 
the sciences of mind were founded, the positivists found it better to impose on them 
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from the outside, the unity capable of ordaining them than to see how in themselves 
this dichotomy between the natural sciences and sciences of mind is articulated. 
 
 
In spite of the dispersion in which the sciences of mind are found, they form a whole, 
a system. This is what makes the difference between Dilthey and the positivists. 
Dilthey seeks the unity of these sciences within themselves. He therefore takes 
psychology as the foundation of the sciences of mind. In view of the Dilthey’s decision 
to base the sciences of mind in psychology, there have been two corollary 
consequences, namely, that the self-foundation of these sciences of mind means that 
they do not need anything than themselves for their existence. This autofoundation 
therefore corroborates their empowerment in relation to the natural. After that, there 
is emancipation of these sciences in relation to metaphysics. According to Dilthey, it 
was on the basis of metaphysics that the sciences of mind were detached, 
endeavouring to treat religion, law, morality, and the nation, not from abstract 
concepts, but by trying to explain human reality of itself and by itself. Even in this 
field, as in the field of the natural sciences, analysis has forever destroyed the 
concepts used by metaphysics in its beautiful period to interpret the facts (Mesure, 
1990: 115). It is in this sense that legal science has replaced natural law theories 
based on an abstract schema of human nature. In the same process, the science of 
psychic life had to replace the ancient metaphysical psychology, which had as its 
object the soul (Dilthey, 1942: 472). The foundation requirement is to be placed in 
the point of view of Dilthey, namely that of bringing the sciences of the mind out of 
their classic double outbuilding. To put it another way, it is a question of constituting 
the sciences of the mind as autonomous sciences. 
 
2.5.3.2  The Diltheyan Choice of Psychology 
Dilthey describes psychology as the fundamental science on which all the sciences 
of mind are founded. It is because psychology is the discipline which, abstracting 
from the living whole, which is the historical and social reality, has for its object the 
general qualities that psychologically individualities acquire (Mesure, 1990: 117). It is 
therefore psychology which supplies matter to the totality of the sciences of mind. On 
this basis, Dilthey thinks that all the concepts used by the historical sciences, “for 
example in law, will, responsibility, in art, creative imagination, the ideal” and all the 
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propositions contained in for example, the principle of the metamorphosis of 
representations under the influence of affective life into aesthetics, the laws of logical 
thought in a theory of science ,"can only be determined satisfactorily if psychology is 
used” (Dilthey, 1988: 79). 
 
 
Psychology is therefore, the matrix of the system of the sciences of mind, since it is 
the basis of all conceptualisations. In other words, it is that on the basis of which 
other sciences of mind are possible and around, which these sciences communicate. 
In the opinion of Mesure, commenting on Dilthey, psychology is the first and most 
elementary of the sciences of mind, the one whose truths are the basis of the edifice, 
which composes the sciences of mind (Dilthey, cited by Mesure, 1990: 117). It should 
be noted here that the sovereignty of psychology over the other sciences of mind has 
been at the heart of a great debate which wanted this sovereignty to return to a theory 
of knowledge (Mesure, 1990: 119-121). 
 
From the Diltheyan perspective, after this bitter dispute between psychology and the 
theory of knowledge, psychology prevailed. On this subject Dilthey asserts that it is “a 
fully developed science of psychic life, a descriptive and comparative psychology that 
subordinates the theory of knowledge” (Mesure, 1990: 122). There is here a 
radicalisation of the psychological foundation. In view of the foregoing, no human 
discipline, whether in law, religion, economics, art or science, can claim autonomy from 
psychology. Mesure, commenting on Dilthey, believes that despite the illusion of Kant's 
criticism of reason, which in principle emancipated the theory of the knowledge from 
psychology, it is now the case, she says, that no transcendental spell, and no magic 
word of The Kantian School can abolish the dependence of the theory of knowledge 
on psychology (Mesure, 1990: 122). Overall, psychology reigns, indeed, at the heart of 
the theory of knowledge. Psychology thus reigns without sharing based on the edifice 
of the sciences of the mind because psychic life is the dimension common to all aspects 
of the world of the mind, and through the intermediary of the theory of knowledge. After 
this analysis of Dilthey's thinking, what about explanation and understanding in his 
hermeneutics? 
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2.6  The articulation explanation-understanding 
Many interpreters of Dilthey who criticised his philosophy have as their starting point 
his famous formula: “we explain nature, we understand the psychic life.” It is the 
interpretation of this formula which has led to the exclusive opposition between 
explanation and understanding. It is in the light of this articulation that we shall 
illuminate the relation between the two methods which constitute the hermeneutic 
circle. But what does Dilthey mean by natural explanation? 
 
 
 
2.6.1. Natural explanation 
In the natural order, human being knows things. Here there is no question of the 
knowledge of the thing in itself, but we know only phenomena of things through space, 
time and categories. Habermas, commenting on Dilthey, asserts that the explanation 
attaches to events given by nomological hypotheses, because of established initial 
conditions. It requires the application of theoretical propositions to facts which have 
been established by systematic observation (Habermas, 1976: 179). In other words, 
in the natural sciences, phenomena are explained by hypotheses, which must be 
subjected to experimental verification. The explanatory approach is the natural 
approach of natural sciences. Since our aim is not to highlight explanation, a specific 
approach of the natural sciences, but understanding in the sciences of the spirit, we 
should now be allowed to devote all our attention to the process specific to the sciences 
of mind, which is understanding. In other words, it is a matter of conceptualising the 
process by which knowledge is possible in the human order. 
 
 
 
 2.6.2  Understanding 
In the sciences of mind, man knows another, that is, his fellow. Man, in fact, is not a 
stranger as is the physical thing, because he gives signs of his own existence. 
Understanding these signs means understanding man. How is it possible for two 
historical beings to know each other? Life, in fact, in its outpouring, produces stable 
forms or configurations, which are called the chain which one must know in order to 
understand man. In the opinion of faithful interpreters of Dilthey, there are two theories 
of understanding in Diltheyan thought: understanding in the horizon of psychology 
and understanding in the horizon of meaning. 
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2.6.2.1  Understanding in the horizon of psychology 
In the first stage of his thought, Dilthey did not go as far as Schleiermacher. 
Understanding is defined as lived participation in the experience of others, or 
sympathy. Understanding a human reality external to mine would literally revive what 
the other has lived, and thus reproduce or recreate a strange or foreign mental element. 
In other words, great historical creations stem from the sympathetic understanding of 
personal characteristics, from our ability to relive the inexhaustible totalities through 
the richness of our lives (Mesure, 1990: 68). This is why, for Habermas, it is the richness 
of our own experience that allows us to imagine, through a sort of transposition, an 
analogous experience outside of us and to understand it. Therefore, we do not 
understand ourselves and understand others unless we transpose our experience into 
all forms of expression from our life and from a foreign life (Habermas, 1976: 183). 
 
This Diltheyan approach to understanding is said to be intuitive, even irrational, by 
the fact that it is connected with the installation of psychology at the centre of the 
sciences of mind. History in this context is above all psychology of the actors of the 
past. Indeed, understanding supposes that the historian takes the place of the actors 
of the past to regain their states of mind and to relive what they have experienced 
(Mesure, 1990: 220). Because of the dominant influence of Schleiermacher, Dilthey 
succeeds in a universal hermeneutics, which considers that the rules governing the 
interpretation of the scriptures also apply to any written or oral expression of mankind. 
In the eyes of Gadamer, Dilthey has especially retained from Schleiermacher the 
belief that the interpretation of a text does not give us access only to the objective 
meaning of words, but also to the individuality of the author (Gadamer, 1996: 175-
177). Accordingly, it is indeed Schleiermacher's reading that led Dilthey to situate 
understanding in the rise of the psychic states present at the genesis of a work. 
Understanding here consists in understanding the author better than he has 
understood himself because there are involuntary representations alongside 
conscious representations. It is interesting to clarify a certain conception of 
understanding that Raymond Aron attributes to Simmel, although it belongs to the 
first theory of Dilthey's understanding. According to this conception, if we know others 
by analogy with ourselves, if we project our own states outward, in this sense, to 
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understand others is to be found in them. Understanding does not reach the other as 
such, but is a transfiguration of ourselves. If understanding is to live or relive, then we 
only understand ourselves (Simmel, cited by Aron, 1987: 195). 
 
 
After a careful reading of this conception of understanding, it is evident that this 
understanding, defined as substituted experience, implies an absurd monadological 
conception of hermeneutics in the moral sciences (Habermas, 1976: 181). At first 
glance, understanding seems to be based on a relationship of intersubjectivity. In 
other words, this understanding gives the impression of communication of a 
consciousness, which is practically impossible. It is, in principle, a sympathetic 
coincidence. As readers, we try to relive the experience of others. There is here 
erasure of my subjectivity, to leave the space for another subjectivity. It is by 
denying my own subjectivity that I coincide with that of others. Additionally, this 
alleged sympathy is merely an opportunity for the reader's consciousness to project 
himself outside and transform himself into that of others. There is here the erasure 
of the subjectivity of others to allow only the subjectivity of the historian to emerge 
(Mesure, 1990: 223). Therefore, due to some perceived difficulties in the first theory, 
Dilthey felt obliged to profoundly rearrange his conception of understanding. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.2.2  Understanding in the horizon of meaning 
Understanding at this stage, therefore, is no longer a question of reliving what the 
authors and the actors have experienced, by probing hearts and kidneys, but of 
constructing the internal logic of a system of the author’s subjectivity, that is, the set 
of values and norms that express its spirit, in other words, give it its meaning. It is 
about understanding everything that makes sense (Dilthey, 1988: 85). There is, for 
the moment, a large gap in the first theory of understanding, which was a 
reconstruction of the germinal process of a work. However, understanding is no longer 
a psychic process that intervenes in the author or his readers. There is now a shift 
from the psychology model. 
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At the heart of this new theory is always the internal/external duality, but the duality is 
no longer that of the depths of the psyche and of its externalizations’ being established 
between the sense of external or internal concepts, but above all the duality between 
the external sensible phenomenalization of life and that which produced it and, which 
manifests itself in it. It is the duality that exists between a given legal system, for 
example, and the spirit that animates it and gives it its meaning (Dilthey, 1988: 83-84). 
In other words, it is a question of understanding the objective spirit of a system or of 
an author. The objective spirit is not to be understood in the Hegelian sense, that is to 
say, the moment of the return to self of the idea. In Hegel’s view, this notion is to be 
understood in its vast speculative system, which means the self-deployment of 
universal rationality. For Dilthey, objective spirit means objectified mind that is, 
externalized or phenomenalized (Hegel and Dilthey cited by Aron, 1987: 78). 
 
In the Diltheyan conception, the notion of the objective spirit leaves the speculative 
ground for the epistemological field and encompasses all the realities amenable 
to letting a meaning be grasped in them, and thus apprehended in terms of spirit. Spirit 
is meant in the sense of the spirit of all mental objectifications, and includes all kinds 
of life forms, lifestyle, language, customs, family, civil society, state and law, in short 
all forms in which the mind is objectified and ... is known (Dilthey, 1988: 151). 
 
Thus, understanding is defined as that which, in external realities such as a piece of 
music, the painting, which one paints, the court, where the right is pronounced, the 
prison where the sentence is served, deals only with meaning. It therefore consists 
in making meaning of a historical event or a social reality by inscribing it in the 
institution to which it belongs. In other words, it consists in grasping the spirit of the 
institutional systems, or the oeuvres, or works, in which the epoch makes sense. It is 
a question of understanding the objectification of the mind. After defining the concepts 
of explanation and comprehension in a long elucidation, we shall now try to appraise 
their value. 
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 2.6.3  The relevance of the articulation 
Many interpreters of Dilthey have thought of the relation between explanation and 
understanding in terms of exclusive opposition. A careful reading of Dilthey's 
exposition on "the stages of historical understanding" in Edification, however leads 
to another perspective. In this argument, Dilthey mentions three main moments of 
historical understanding. The first stage is that of the narrative and is animated by the 
curiosity of the human reality, especially as it relates to the homeland. This stage 
corresponds to the work of Herodotus. The second is that of orientation towards 
explanation. This period is initiated by the work of Thucydides. Through the 
explanation of the past Thucydides highlighted the fact that apart from curiosity, there 
are other reasons to study history. 
 
 
In short, by highlighting its explanatory dimension, Thucydides has shown the 
decisive importance of history for political thought, since, as in the natural sciences, 
the demonstration of regularity in the interactive whole also makes possible in history 
prediction and action based on knowledge. His successors, like Polybius, only 
enriched the process by inserting in the explanatory method the action of durable 
forces such as those of the constitution, military organisation, and finances and 
deducing from the study the forces which act in this state in the various political 
events. It is necessary to add to the explanatory method the spiritual forces as 
Machiavelli and Guicciardini did. 
 
 
The third stage corresponds to the time of Voltaire (in the 18th century).Thus opens 
the period of modern historiography, marked by the fact that historians are interested 
in everything that is cultural history or culture. Indeed, the beginning of historical 
knowledge is no longer the explanation of a succession of political events, but a history 
of culture, which calls for an understanding of the collaboration of such cultural 
systems. Understanding becomes one of the essential moments in the historian's 
approach (Dilthey, 1988: 106). 
 
 
According to Dilthey, the three stages remain alive in historiography, that is to say 
that one cannot reject out of hand the stages represented by Thucydides and 
Herodotus in favour of the comprehension as such. He affirms: 
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The joyful art of the narrative, the explanation that goes to the heart of things, 
the application of systematic knowledge, analysis of particular interactive 
sets and the principle of evolution, these moments integrate with each 
other and reinforce each other (Dilthey, 1988: 157). 
 
 
There is an integration of an explanatory moment into the process of the sciences of 
the mind because, first, their object is a psycho-physical entity, which implies both 
approaches, and secondly because the logic of these sciences imposes a 
combinatorial understanding and explanation. There is therefore no exclusion 
between the two approaches, but there is complementarity even if, in Dilthey, there 
is a predominance of understanding. 
 
Thus, in Diltheyan thought, in order to account for a human, historical or social reality, 
there is first the explanation, and then comes the understanding, which is grafted 
onto the first. In this sense, the relation of explanation and understanding is not one 
of mutual exclusion, but a mutual dependence because every explanation calls for 
an understanding. However, the entire process of complementary approaches is 
mainly due to the fact that comprehension is the one feature of the sciences of mind 
whose originality in relation to the natural sciences was to be demonstrated. It is in 
this sense that it is up to every interpreter of a work. 
 
 
In fact, it seems to me that the relevance of this articulation should be completed by 
repeating Arendt's statement that "the real meaning of every event always transcends 
the past causes that can be assigned to it" (Arendt, 1980: 97-98). This formula clearly 
explains this interdependence from one side to the other. 
 
 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
This chapter had discussed the question “How do we understand?” Based on the 
works of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, two prominent names in modern 
hermeneutics. The first section of the chapter underlined hermeneutics as the art of 
understanding and showed that the problem of understanding was intimately linked 
to the central act of discourse. However, in order to understand the discourse, 
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Schleiermacher argued that it was necessary to go through the grammatical 
interpretation. This was important to recover the meaning solely from the analysis of 
language and from the technical interpretation, as started by the person or the subject 
of discourse, to understand the latter. This concept of interpretation supported the 
contention that divinatory and comparative methods were important in the process of 
understanding. Understanding from the Schleiermacherian perspective was mainly 
described as a psychological reconstruction of the creative process in its essentially 
expressive dimension. 
 
In the second part, the discussion focused on understanding in the Diltheyan sense. 
The distinction between the sciences of mind and the sciences of nature was made 
by underlining the complementarity between explanation and understanding. In 
Dilthey’s work, two theories of understanding were analyzed. Understanding was 
defined as the grasping or the arising of sense, or the objective spirit of an event, a 
social reality. In short, for the two authors, the being, which is a question of knowing 
here, is a being as Seindes. There is already from this perspective the occultation or 
forgetfulness of being (Sein) in favour of the beings (Seindes), which are the object 
of the sciences of the spirit. This matter of occultation will be the topic of our next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF BEING 
 
3.1  Introduction 
From the beginning of philosophy, the problematic of ‘being’ has been at the core of 
debate in this field. For those accustomed to philosophical praxis, it is superfluous to 
recall that the question of ‘being’ underlies the work of Heidegger and traverses it from 
beginning to end. In Heidegger’s view, the concept of ‘being’ is the most equivocal, 
the most general and the emptiest in philosophy (Heidegger, 1992: 25). 
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The difficulty raised by the notion of being led in the history of Western philosophy to 
the occultation of this notion. The main concern throughout the history of considering 
the question of ‘being’ was about the attitude of the metaphysics thinkers in forgetting 
this question that served them as the guideline (Heidegger, 1992: 25). In order to 
address this issue, this investigation uses the critical analysis method by considering 
the history of western philosophy. Firstly, the question of forgetting ‘being’ and truth 
is addressed, and secondly, the focus is on the beings other than Dasein and finally 
on Dasein itself. 
 
 
 
3.2 The question of being and metaphysics 
In Heidegger’s understanding, the concept of “being” is the most general and empty 
word (Heidegger, 1992: 25) because of several challenges raised by its definition. 
These difficulties are captured in the three following prejudices: 
 
Firstly, it has been maintained that ‘Being’ is the “most universal” concept 
[…]. An understanding of ‘being’ is already included in conceiving 
anything which one apprehends as an entity. But the “universality” of 
‘Being’ is not that of a class or genus. The term ‘being’ does not define 
that realm of entities which is uppermost when these are Articulated (sic) 
conceptually according to genus and species […]. It has been maintained 
secondly that the concept of ‘Being’ is indefinable. This is deduced from 
its supreme universality, and rightly so, if definitio fit per genus proximum 
et differentiam specificam […]. 
The indefinability of ‘being’ does not eliminate the question of its meaning; 
it demands that we look that question in the face. Thirdly, it is held that 
‘being’ is of all concepts the one that is self-evident. Whenever one 
cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself 
towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made of ‘being’; as 
this expression is held to be intelligible “without further ado”, just as 
everyone understands “The sky is blue”, “I am merry”. The very fact that 
we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of ‘being’ 
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is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise 
this question again (Heidegger, 1980: 22-23). 
 
In view of the above, it is important now to review the question of being throughout 
the history of metaphysics. However, the postulate and the basic observation are that 
being has never been thought of in its truth, not only because philosophers have posed 
and elaborated in insufficient detail the question, but also because ‘being’ does not 
give itself up: it reveals itself or is never revealed only by veiling simultaneously 
(Hottois, 2002: 344). It should be pointed out here that the great philosophical 
misunderstanding par excellence of all time is the confusion of ‘being’ and beings. 
Metaphysics as the history of philosophy has been misguided by thinking of ‘being’ 
exclusively as beings. In other words, ‘being’ has been identified as beings 
(Heidegger, 1992: 51). 
 
Martin Heidegger considers all precedent ontology to be a monstrous outgrowth 
stifling the truths that we saw in the beginning. Ontology, he argues, is trivialised. The 
heaviest responsibility lies with scholasticism. Indeed, the early Greek philosophers 
had already prepared the seed for this forgetfulness of the question of ‘being’ since 
the initial deviations appear in the very works of those who created metaphysics 
(Heidegger, 1992: 3). For Heidegger, although there were glimmers of truth at the 
beginning of philosophical thought, as early as Plato, philosophy began to obscure 
the question of ‘being’. This error reached its climax with Descartes at the beginning 
of modernity, culminating with Nietzsche and reaching its decline with the evolution 
of technology (Hottois, 2002; Steiner, 1987: 70). 
In his idealist realism, Plato identifies being with ideas. These are the most real, most 
important being. Thus, ‘being’ is wrongly identified with essential forms whose 
essential characteristics are visibility and permanence, in short the eternal presence. 
 
 
In another register of language, in Plato, the truth is the ideal, that is to say ‘being’ is 
visible to the intellect. What counts here, as the truth is the fact of revealing itself, of 
appearing in the present, while the obscure and the concealed from which the 
appearance comes are forgotten. The ‘true being’ being the visible, the important thing 
is to perceive what is revealed and if the truth is the ideal, the truth of the thought is 
thus the orthotes, to see right and to reflect this report in which, in this way, it is true 
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in so far as it conforms to what manifests itself (Vattimo, 1985: 98). Plato identified 
being with ‘transcendent beings, thought the other of matter and becoming (of the 
sensible), but not the other of all being. Thus, in seeking not ‘being’ as such, but the 
being of beings, Plato has established a hierarchy of beings. We have in the 
foreground the essential ideals that give material things a little stability and reality 
(Hottois, 2002: 346). 
 
 
 
According to Aristotle, ‘being’ is considered in two senses, it is first seen as what 
(eidos), that is to say, as essence, and then as presence or ousia (Heidegger, 1975: 
5), that is to say, actual existence. This last is for Aristotle energy (energeia), and it 
is to the act of existing effectively that it attributes the ‘being’ of the first way and not 
to the essence or eidos (Vattimo, 1985: 99). This valorization of energeia brings 
Aristotle closer to the origin of the concept of aletheia in the sense that thinking of 
‘being’ as an act is to think of it as the point of arrival of a process and therefore as 
"coming from". Moreover, the fact that energeia is distinct from the eidos; or in other 
words the fact that the "que" is distinct from ‘what’ or essence, makes the Aristotelian 
position a step closer to the ever more complete identification of being with what is 
actually present (Heidegger, 1992: 51). 
 
In the middle ages with St. Augustine of Hippo and Denys Aeropagite, there is 
a reorientation of the question of ‘being’ (Heidegger, 1992: 26). The question of the 
origin of the world brings out that of the reason of existence. By reasoning thus, 
medieval philosophers are led to discover the supreme essence: the one who is in 
the Bible. This esse is conceived as the immutable ‘being’ superessentialis. 
 
However, with St. Thomas Aquinas, we can no longer say of an object that it is 
because it is a ‘being’, we must now reverse the proposition. It is an ens only in so 
far as it refers to the esse; ens means habensesse. In this way, Thomas Aquinas 
directs the question of ‘being’ to the supremely eminent Being: the ipsumesse of God, 
and at the same time breaks with the Greek question of being understood as toti en 
einai. The question now applies to a ‘being’ whose being has its roots beyond mere 
quiddity, to the pure act of existing (Jacob, 1990: 89-90). 
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Descartes is in his turn the philosopher with whom we find a first result that is decisive 
of the forgetfulness of the ‘being’, which takes into account all the implications of the 
Greek conception of ‘being’ as idea (Plato) and as energeia (Aristotle). To Descartes, 
only what is stably defined by a form (idea, that is to say visibility) is true because the 
Greek word "idea" has the same root as the verb "to see", that which is actually present 
(Descartes, cited by Vattimo, 1985: 99). True being has as a fundamental trait the 
fact of giving itself as certain: the constitutive trait of being is the certainty, the 
character of what is indubitable (Vattimo, 1985: 99). Indeed, the turning point initiated 
by Descartes in the conception of being is that of modernity, but it is in the continuity 
of the Platonic reduction of being to beings. Cartesian philosophy is characterised by 
the primacy of the subject who becomes the Supreme Being, the ultimate foundation 
of all other beings assimilated to objects. It is in this sense, that in seeking the truth, 
humankind is absolutely certain of two realities: 
 
• his own existence as ego cogitans (the unquestionable certainty of the 
cogito) 
 
and 
 
• his own representations. This is what he poses before himself in thought. Clear 
and obvious representations are therefore the only objective objects because they 
are what the ego cogitans extraposes. It is about what he apprehends directly and of 
which he can be sure (Heidegger, 1992: 50).With this Cartesian transformation that 
is far from being a simple story of words and ways of thinking, the absolute and 
unshakable foundation of reality is now the human ego, before which the ‘being of 
things’ must be legitimized, ‘being,’ which is recognised as ‘being’ only to the extent 
that it is certain. 
 
In line with all of the above, Steiner affirms Descartes’s point of view: 
 
 
Beings are only true insofar as they enter into the polarized bond of rational 
subject and verifiable object… Everything is referred back to the human 
viewer. The cogito comes before the sum; thought precedes being; truth is 
a function of the certitude of the human subject (Steiner, 1987: 70). 
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It is noted, moreover, that the notion of objectivity, of which modern philosophy makes 
such great use, is always correlative to that of the subject. Nevertheless, what 
constitutes it is then and precisely the certainty that the subject has about it (Vattimo, 
1985: 100). This desire for certainty, characteristic of modernity, goes hand in hand 
with the development of analytical, calculating, methodical thought that quantifies and 
measures everything. In this context, mathematics is very important for the 
development of assured knowledge that will unfold under the name of modern science. 
This certain knowledge is also a guarantee of the actual presence of the subject in 
the midst of being. The subject has "objective control" of nature and dominates the 
latter through science and technology. However, even if with Descartes, the truthful 
god ensures the adequacy of my obvious representations and the laws of nature, the 
certainty about this truthful god is founded only on the evidence that I have of the idea 
of such a god. The ego cogitans is, in fact, regarded as the ultimate foundation of all 
truth and reality (Heidegger, 1992: 50). In view of all the foregoing, on the part of the 
subject, the Cartesian reduction of being-true to the certainty of the subject is only 
the reduction of things to oneself, a reduction, which has the meaning of taking 
possession. At the end of this process, the reduction of being to certainty is its 
reduction to the will of the subject. 
 
 
In the opinion of Gilbert Hottois, the great metaphysical systems of the nineteenth 
century, principally those of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, could not have been 
conceived without the existence of this subject, animated by the desire to reduce 
everything to itself. In addition, the very form of the system, as a reduction of the real 
to a single principle, could only arise in this epoch of the self-conceived as a desire 
to reduce to oneself the totality of ‘being’ (Hottois, 2002: 101). Moreover, it is from 
this perspective that modern philosophy is said to be a philosophy of subjectivity, an 
anthropocentrism. The radical assurance that the subject thus acquires concerns the 
theoretical side of knowledge, that is to say a technique that is more and more powerful, 
rendering man the master and possessor of nature and, on the moral dimension, that 
is to say, man is free, he is the source and the foundation of all values and laws. 
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Cartesian philosophy institutes dualism, no longer between becoming and eternity, 
like Plato, but between man, the thinking and free subject, and all the rest of ‘being’. 
This is the dualism between the subject and the object. 
 
 
 
Kant, following Descartes, neglected the question of ‘being’ by the very fact that 
he missed a thematic ontology of Dasein and an ontological analytic, preliminary to 
the subjectivity of the subject. This is why he has only dogmatically taken up 
Cartesian views by revising them a little (Heidegger, 1992: 50).  Moreover, of all 
these philosophers mentioned here, Nietzsche is the one who completes the 
history of Western metaphysics, and therefore the forgetfulness of being, without 
succeeding in getting rid of it (Heidegger, 1992: 347). The same is held by Vattimo. 
According to the latter, metaphysics comes to an end in Nietzsche because he 
presents himself as the first true nihilist, and the most profound essence of 
metaphysics is precisely nihilism: “the history of nihilism is that in which there is 
nothing about being itself, and this story is precisely that of metaphysics as a 
forgetting of being, which is hardening more and more” (Vattimo, 1985: 97). 
 
 
With Nietzsche, there are only people left. Only the totality of ‘being’ is still considered. 
This contemporary nihilism homogenizes essence fundamentally. Everything has 
worth and nothing has more value than itself. This radical homogenization, which 
consumes the forgetting of the forgetfulness of the ontological difference is present 
in philosophy from its origin and culminates in contemporary nihilism (Steiner, 1987: 
70). Indeed, temporalization does not consist in thinking about the internal link 
between ‘time and being’. It amounts to considering only the becoming that man 
conceives as an unlimited process devoid of any meaning and purpose (Heidegger, 
1985b: 376). It should be noted that the totality of ‘being’ in the infinite process of time 
is nothing but the expression of the will to power in the sense of creativity, and 
incessant productivity of forms and contents. This will to power does not pass only for 
the ‘being’ of being, of  nature, but also of humankind, that is to say, of the subject. It 
is for this reason, Steiner elucidates as follows: “the Nietzschean Will-to-Power is 
itself only a wildly exalted subjectivity” (Steiner, 1987: 70). 
 
47 
 
Since having no finality of itself, the will to power is aimed only at its own development 
and infinite growth. A product of the will to power, man has become the subject of 
this will. Now it is human being who invents goals and values from a radical freedom 
or spontaneity. This Nietzschean man, or the nihilist man, constantly reinterprets 
being in order to work it, to operate it, to destroy it, to store it and to create new forms 
and new contents (Steiner, 1987: 70). Starting from this moment, all the goals, all the 
values, appear from now on as posed without reason or necessity by human 
subjectivity. It is the reign of relativism and decisionism, morals and conceptions of 
the world without any other foundation than the irrational and contingent act that 
institutes ephemeral matter (Hottois, 2002: 349). 
 
 
Having as his concern the development of ever more power and new possibilities, man 
is particularly concerned with his survival, a necessary condition for the further 
deployment of his will to power. That is why he will seek to dominate and to control 
nature. Thus, sciences and techniques appear as privileged means of the will of human 
power, which reduces the truth to efficiency, thought to computation and the real to 
a matter infinitely operable and exploitable. 
 
 
Indeed, Nietzschean nihilism is well suited to the description of the twentieth century 
under the label of techno-science, which is seen by Heidegger as the culmination of 
metaphysics and thus in this way as the ultimate stage of the history of ‘being’ 
(Heidegger, 1968a: 237). As if to increase the above, technique is, in the opinion of 
Gianni Vattimo, precisely the phenomenon, which in terms of inhabiting the world of 
man, expresses the unfolding and the completion of metaphysics. The exclusive 
donation of ‘being’ as a will theorized by Nietzsche - the extreme concealment of ‘being’ 
that leaves nothing to be seen as being – corresponds to the modern technique that 
gives the world the form of what we call today total organisation (Vattimo, 1985: 103). 
The technique takes the last step on the path of eliminating any residual difference 
between true reality and empirical reality. Once this ontological difference is finally, 
abolished, the last and feeble memory of this difference is abolished. Of being itself, 
nothing remains, there are only beings. The being of the being is totally and exclusively 
being posited by the will of humankind, the producer and organizer. It is understood 
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that for Heidegger, complete metaphysics is the technique and general 
instrumentalization of the world (Heidegger, 1968a: 237). 
 
 
More fundamental than any attitude of being, truth as unveiling always implies a 
concealment. Decay and error are founded on the essence of truth. It is in this order 
of ideas that we understand well the fact that metaphysics, while posing the question 
of being, immediately forgets it and confines itself to the consideration of beings 
(Heidegger, 1968a: 89). Since ancient times, philosophy has always associated truth 
with being. In this sense, the phenomenon of truth is in the trimming of the problematic 
of fundamental ontology (Heidegger, 1968a: 263-264). According to William Earle: 
 
 
The history of Western thought from the pre-Socratics to the present is 
the history of the degradation of human essence through a 
forgetfulness of 
‘being’ to such an extent that Nietzsche, at its end, could say that Being 
is nothing but an empty sound, a mist. ‘Being’, like God, is dead (Earle, 
1958: 86). 
 
 
 
3.3 Truth and Non-truth 
Heidegger starts from the common notion, in the metaphysical tradition, of truth as 
the conformity of the proposition to the thing. To be true, the proposition must conform 
to the thing. However, this conformity is possible only in a domain where the being-
there can relate to the being that is already opened. This is the opening of being-
there to ‘being’ (Heidegger, 1968a: 263-264; Smith, 2007: 158). 
 
 
 
Heidegger does not simply reject the conception of truth as conformity or 
correspondence (Wrathall, 1999: 71), but assumes it to be the original and immediate 
phenomenological mode in which the experience of truth is given, a mode, from which 
one must depart and which cannot be liquidated as pure appearance. To seek to 
conform to the thing means to take the thing as the norm of our judgment and our 
speech: the fact that there is here a norm, to which we must conform means that it is 
49 
 
freedom, which is here at stake. To open oneself to the thing as it is by seeking to 
conform to it as a norm is an act of freedom (Heidegger, 1968a: 263-264). 
 
From the same perspective, Georges Ndumba asserts that truth or falseness depends 
on the objects, of their union or their separation, so that to be in the truth is to think 
that what is separated is separated, and that what is united is united, and to be in the 
wrong is to think contrary to the nature of objects. It is not because we think in a true 
way that you are white, but because you are white, that by saying that you are white, 
we are telling the truth. This example shows us that the ontological truth is the one 
that determines the noologique truth (Ndumba, 1988: 97). 
 
 
On the other hand, the question we are asking ourselves is whether to assert that the 
essence of truth is freedom as the opening of being to ‘being’ is not to reduce the truth 
to something subjective, to an arbitrary act of humankind. It would be so if we thought 
of freedom as a property of humankind. One cannot therefore think of the fact that 
‘being’ becomes accessible as a free act of humankind understood in the subjective 
sense. Openness to ‘being’ is not something that humankind can choose because it 
constitutes the ‘being-there’ him or herself as such and as being-in-the-world 
(Ndumba,1988: 24). This freedom is therefore in no way a faculty of which Dasein 
would dispose, it is rather that which disposes of it. Humankind does not have 
freedom as a property, rather the opposite is true. 
 
 
 
Freedom, ‘being’ ek-sistant and revealing possesses humankind and it is so original 
that it alone allows a humanity to come into contact with a being as such in its totality, 
a rapport that founds and draws all history. It is the original opening to the world that 
makes possible any conformity to being (truth) and any choice (practice) does not 
depend on a choice made by humankind itself but constitutes it. That would mean 
that being-there can come into contact with the beings as it is always already thrown 
into a historical opening (Ndumba, 1988: 85).The fact that liberty disposes of 
humankind therefore signifies in essence that humankind has access to being and to 
oneself when an individual makes him or herself an object of knowledge in a light, 
which there is always, the basis of understanding, which he does not choose, but 
which constitutes the self as a being-there. 
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Besides, in Being and Time, Heidegger asserts that the concrete historical existence 
of man is always already fallen, that is to say, inauthentic (Heidegger, 1992: § 27). If 
the truth is freedom as (laissez-être l’etant) “letting being be” (See Steiner, 1987: 71), 
an opening to being in what it is, this freedom can always be exercised as not to let 
be the being of being as such, by disguising and distorting it. However, “in order that” 
the opening that makes being acceptable be possible, something such as not letting 
being appear as it is, an error which could occur in different forms, including moral 
ones, this possibility must be inscribed in the original structure of the opening itself 
(Heidegger,1992: §27). 
 
 
 
This ek-sistant freedom as the essence of truth is not a property of man, but man does 
not exist unless he is possessed of this freedom and thus made capable of history. 
The essence of non-truth cannot therefore arise from the mere incapacity and 
negligence of man, but rather from the essence of truth. If we think of the truth as 
original openness and as unveiling, then non-truth will have to be thought of as 
darkness and veiling. We find an example of the deep link that exists between truth 
and non-truth in the Greek word Aletheia, which possesses an a privative, which 
indicates that the manifestation of the truth as unveiling presupposes a buckling and 
a burial originating from which the truth comes (Heidegger, 1992: 222 & 267). 
Accordingly, Wrathall explains the Heideggerian origin of Aletheia clearly in the 
following statement. He posits that: 
 
 
aletheia must be understood as a privative alpha af. Xed (sic) to the stem leth- 
or lath-, and he referred to Aristotle and Heraclitus as support for his claim 
that the oldest tradition of philosophy understood truth precisely as a ‘taking 
entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their 
unhiddenness (Wrathall, 2010: 14). 
 
 
In line with what is said above, Natalija Bonic casts more light and affirms with 
concision: 
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In Being and Time, as well as in On the Essence of Truth, Heidegger 
introduces his conception of truth by way of contrast with the traditional 
conceptions  -  truth  as  homoiosis  (Aristotle),  adaequatio  (Aquinas),  and 
Übereinstimmung (Kant) - all of which he claims to be "derivative", i.e., 
founded on, and thus already removed from, the original meaning of truth. 
Originally, truth is not to be conceived as agreement or correspondence, but 
in the phenomenological sense, as disclosure, bringing-to-light. If something 
is to be brought into agreement with something else, Heidegger argues, it 
must have first been dis- closed, rendered visible/intelligible. "Truth is 
disclosure of beings through which an openness essentially unfolds." Truth, 
in the sense of "disclosure of beings", is in Being and Time called 
uncoveredness (Entdecktheit) and in On the Essence of Truth 
unhiddenness (Entborgenheit) (Bonic, 2005: 63). 
 
 
Moreover, the original connection between truth and untruth is revealed by 
phenomenological analysis in the fact that any truth that we can say or know is the 
manifestation of a particular ‘being’ or a group of beings, never the appearance 
of ‘being’ as such in its totality. Furthermore, particular beings or groups of beings 
appear to us precisely to the extent that the totality of being does not come to the 
forefront as such. Vattimo puts it better: “to the extent that the let-be lets be the being 
to which it relates in a particular relation and thus unveils it, it veils the being in totality 
in itself, the let-be is at the same time a veil” (Vattimo, 1985: 86). It is also in this vein 
that we must understand that this veiling of the totality of the being is the non-truth 
essentially linked to the truth. This dissimulation of the being in totality is not simply 
a consequence of the fact that we know being only partially (Vattimo, 1985: 87). 
 
 
Nevertheless, what is the derivative of the possibility of error, that is, the disguise and 
distortion of being? It is therefore legitimate to think that error depends either on the 
fact of not knowing everything (concealment of the being in totality), or of the 
preponderance of one being over the others (errors related to interest for example). 
However, it is above all to the inauthentic existence of being-there, to decay, that is 
linked the untruth that belongs to the very essence of truth (Heidegger, 1992: 27). In 
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line with this, Natalija Bonic affirms that the issue of the untruth is linked to the truth 
and Heidegger was very concerned about it. She states: 
 
For Heidegger, the task of philosophy is not only to pursue truth, as has 
been traditionally maintained since the time of Plato, but also, and crucially 
so, to combat untruth. By untruth, Heidegger means the various 
misconceptions and problems, which, if undetected, can lead philosophical 
inquiry seriously astray. The danger of being led astray is aggravated by 
the fact untruth mostly comes in disguise, id est, as semblant truth. For that 
reason, it is of essential importance for any inquiry to understandingly 
distinguish between truth and untruth, or else risk the possibility of being 
misled (Bonic, 2005: 61). 
 
 
In fact, in everyday life, installation consists in not letting the concealment of what is 
concealed prevail. Where the being concealed from being in totality is only tolerated 
as a limit, which accidentally announces itself to us, concealment as a fundamental 
event is absorbed by oblivion. The decay of inauthentic existence is therefore 
possible only because truth itself implies in itself non-truth as obscuration necessarily 
bound to all enlightenment. Being-there is often in existence inauthentic because of 
the very essence of truth, that is to say, the very structure of being (Heidegger, 1992: 
55). 
 
 
3.4  Overcoming metaphysics 
The tendency inscribed in metaphysics from the very beginning, to forget ‘being’, by 
letting the foreground come to the fore only as being such a tendency founded on 
the essential link uniting truth and untruth, is therefore perfectly realized in the world 
of the technique (Earle, 1958: 86). In realising its forgetful essence, metaphysics also 
comes to an end in that there is no longer any meta, no beyond. The being of being 
is no longer something for which we must look beyond ‘being’, it is its actual 
functioning within an instrumental system posited by the will of the subject. It is 
precisely in this situation of extreme distress of thought that it becomes possible to 
go beyond metaphysics and, perhaps, to escape the oblivion of the ‘being’ that 
characterises it. That is why Joshua Tepley commenting on Heidegger affirmed this: 
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Metaphysics thinks entities as entities; ‘Because metaphysics interrogates 
entities as entities, it remains concerned with entities and does not turn itself 
to being as ‘being’; “Metaphysics”, insofar as it always represents only 
entities as entities, does not recall being itself’.  In sum, metaphysics 
concerns itself only with entities, not with being. Its lack of concern with the 
latter is why it must be overcome (Tepley, 2014: 475-476). 
 
 
To Heidegger, the sustenance of metaphysics can only be possible when it forgets 
its forgetfulness (Heidegger, 1985a: §14). To perceive oblivion leads us to ask 
ourselves a decisive question which, in substance, is the one formulated in slightly 
different terms by the last paragraph of Being and Time, asking why the being of 
being could have come to be thought of as mere presence (Heidegger, 1992: §83). 
Here the question has taken a more radically historical turn: how was it possible to 
arrive at the point of complete forgetfulness of the being in which we find ourselves? 
Or as Heidegger put it: “Why is there ‘being’ in general at all, and not rather nothing?” 
(Heidegger, cited by Earle, 1958: 85). It is from here that the reflection on 
metaphysics begins as a history and, in this reflection, is already implicitly a project 
of the meaning of being which is no longer metaphysical. It is clear, indeed, that the 
perception of oblivion already implies a stance, which in a rudimentary way, is no 
longer in this oblivion. 
 
 
From Heidegger’s point of view, it is the same thing to understand metaphysics as 
history and to come out of it by understanding being in a different sense from the way 
metaphysics did. Hence the significance, not only of the negative destruction of the 
history of ontology, but still positive, the elaboration of a new project of the sense of 
being, which Heidegger's reflection on the history of metaphysics undertakes 
(Heidegger, 1992: 49). 
 
 
Commenting on Heidegger, George Steiner (1987) asserts that historical reflection 
does not have the sense of knowing, in the history of thought, as the progressive 
unveiling of a truth, which from the point of view of the absolute knowledge, which 
Hegel considers to have reached, can be recognised as such and integrated into a 
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definitive perspective (Steiner, 1987: 70). It follows, according to Heidegger, that 
since the questioning of being is characterized by the fact that it absolutely forbids 
the establishment of a radical distinction between the object of the question and the 
being who asks the question, all research of a metaphysical nature has the property 
of questioning the very one who questions: the action of questioning becomes a mode 
of being of the questioner. We are the existent who questions the being of all 
existence. It is here that the position of the general ontological problem is logically 
prepared by a phenomenological examination of this Dasein, which constitutes the 
access path and the fulcrum of all metaphysics (Heidegger, 1992: 44 & Earle, 1958: 
87). 
 
 
To George Steiner, commenting on Heidegger, traditional metaphysics must be 
overcome because: 
 
 
In all metaphysics as we know it since Parmenides, and even in the most 
existentially biased of philosophic theologies, to think is, in essence, to see, 
to observe. As result, Sein is something made present to the eye. As such, 
it has remained unthought, Ungedacht, and has not been made articulate 
in language. And also, all Western metaphysics, whether deliberately or 
not, has been Platonist in that it has sought to transpose the essence of 
man out of daily life. It has posited a pure perceiver, a fictive agent of 
cognition detached from common experience. It has disincarnated being 
through an artifice of introspective reductionism of the sort dramatized in 
Cartesian doubt and Husserlian phenomenology. That is why Heidegger 
must begin all over again (Steiner, 1987: 78 & 81). 
 
 
Nevertheless, Heidegger has to find a way to pose the question of being by refusing 
the abstraction of the traditional ontologies and replacing them with a new ontology. 
Steiner articulates: 
 
 
Sein und Zeit will try to think and say being and Being. It will try to. The 
imperative is, strictly, one of attempt […]. To think Being is the task 
of Heidegger’s Fundamental ontology, that ontology of foundations which 
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is to be distinguished utterly from the Platonic model of ideal Forms, 
from the Aristolian-Aquinian network of cause and substance, from 
Cartesian scientific rationality and from Nietzsche’s inspired, but nihilistic, 
identification of being and will. The fundamental ontology is to replace 
all particular ontologies [..]. Heidegger utterly rejects this procession of 
abstraction and what he regards as the resultant artifice of 
compartmentalization in man’s consideration of man [...]. A philosophy 
which abstracts, which seeks to elevate itself above the everydayness of 
the everyday, is empty. It can tell us nothing of the meaning of being, of 
where and what Dasein is (Steiner,1987: 78-81). 
 
 
 
3.5 Dasein 
Dasein is one of the key concepts of Heideggerian philosophy. This assertion is 
confirmed in the quotation of Sheehan below: 
 
 
The concept of Dasein is pivotal to the philosophical standpoint of 
Heidegger. Although not directly translatable into English, in colloquial 
German, Dasein means human existence with the entity to ask what it 
means to be. Similarly Johnson (2002) defined Dasein as meaning be-
there. Dasein is the foundation upon which Heidegger built up the entirety 
of his thinking. Sheehan summarised by stating that “…Dasein is the 
answer to the questions about the meaning of being” (Sheehan et al. cited 
by McConnell-Henry et al., 2009: 5). 
 
 
In the same vein as all of the above, Carl Mitcham affirms that: 
 
 
 
Dasein’ is a German word, which may be literally translated as ‘there [da] 
being [Sein]’ or ‘being there’. Although not coined by Martin Heidegger, in 
his major work Being and Time (1927), he gives the term special 
philosophical significance. Prior to Heidegger, Dasein was often used 
technically to indicate the kind of being or existence that a thing has; more 
commonly it referred to the being of persons. Heidegger follows and 
56 
 
intensifies the common usage when, in the introduction to Being and Time, 
which is dedicated to ‘the question of the meaning of Being’, he attempts 
to determine how to address this question (Mitcham, 2001: 28). 
 
 
 
 
 
According to François Vezin (1986), Dasein is one of the central notions in Martin 
Heidegger's masterpiece: Being and Time. At first, this term, which is formed of da, 
there, and sein, to be, is not a philosophical term. It is the substantive infinitive of 
the verb dasein, to be present. Regardless of whether it is a verb first, the Hegelian 
expression (Dasein) quoted by Heidegger offers an example. But as a substantive, 
Dasein is neutral. He uses the definite article and writes the word with a capital letter, 
like all the nouns in German: das Dasein. 
 
 
 
In the 17th century, Dasein meant presence and this meaning remained in use and 
featured in all dictionaries. On the other hand, in the 18th century, it received its 
philosophical meaning. It is the Latin equivalent of existentia and the French 
existence. Indeed, in the 21st century, Dasein means human life, human existence. 
But when Heidegger uses it, in French it means that he himself will specify it in Being 
and Time as being or humankind. In Heidegger's opinion, the word Dasein is not 
synonymous, but a namesake of humankind (Heidegger, 1992: 521). This Dasein is 
not a subject for whom there is an object, but a being in being. It does not mean man 
or subject, even if it is true that we are such, but the place where the question of being 
arises, the place of manifestation (Kangudi, 2006). After this brief history of the 
Dasein concept, it becomes easier to inquire into Dasein itself. 
 
 
3.5.1 The quiddity of Dasein 
To Heidegger, “Dasein is an entity, which is in each case I myself; its being is in each 
case mine” (Heidegger, 1980: 150). But what is meant by being? Being is what 
something that is as it is, and all that is, including man, that is, Dasein is. Being is 
thus, defined by its being, because it makes that which is so named being, and not 
rather not being. To question the being refers to the being of Dasein. Being cannot be 
grasped as far as it is in virtue of his being. But being, in the same way, refers to the 
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being of which he (being) is to be. The beingness of being, it is first what makes the 
being to be, and what makes it be what it is, it is the ousia or beingness (Heidegger, 
1975: 8), the étance of the being (Jacob, 1990: 860). 
 
 
Since we are ourselves every day and have the possibility, among other things, 
of questioning, we place it in our terminology under the name of Dasein, and Da-sein 
is synonymous with everything except the man (Heidegger, 1992: 31). The specificity 
of Dasein is that it only needs to be for this being who is to be discovered. The 
agreement of being is itself a determination to be Dasein. What ontically 
distinguishes Dasein is that it is ontological. The ontological being of Dasein, to which 
we are referring is characterised as fore-ontological, that is to say, it enters into the 
manner of being of Dasein, an understanding of being (Heidegger, 1992: 36). 
 
 
 
Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence –in terms of a possibility of 
itself: to be itself or not itself (Heidegger, 1980: 33). The question of its existence 
could be clarified by itself. The latter is an ontic (what is related to beings) affair for 
Dasein. This is why the analytic of existence has the character of understanding 
that is not existentiell but existential (Heidegger, 1980:33). The existential analysis of 
Dasein is pre-inscribed in the ontic constitution of Dasein. 
 
 
 
In Heidegger’s view, Dasein has a primacy that is on several levels, but for our purpose, 
let us focus on three. The first level is an ontic primacy. This being is determined in 
its being by existence. The second level is an ontological primacy. Based on his 
determination by existence, Dasein is in itself ontological. Dasein has a third primacy 
because it is the ontic and ontological condition of possibility of all ontologies 
(Heidegger, 1992: 38). 
 
 
In the opinion of De Waelhens (1971), Dasein is characterized in its being by the 
permanent relation of instability that it maintains with itself. Dasein is an existent whose 
being is always put in play. Everything that Dasein is or can be is characterized by 
its uncertainty and proves to be dependent on possibilities of which it alone will 
decide. It is therefore inseparable from the study of its existence and merges with it 
(De Waelhens, 1971: 27). 
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It follows, since only Dasein is interpreting, that only it confers meaning, and that it is 
meaningful only relatively to him (Dasein). The other existing ones have meaning only 
as signified by him and relatively. Any existing that is not of the Dasein type must be 
considered as meaningless in itself. Dasein is distinguished from all other raw existing 
by its capacity of transcendence that is to say by its capacity to constitute, to 
understand an intelligibility, a ‘being’. However, only man, among all beings, knows 
that being is. In other words, the understanding of being distinguishes man within the 
beings (Heidegger, 1968b: 79). On the other hand, the tool has a particular mode 
of existing that one could qualify as referential. This mode is called "being-under-the 
hand" in order to highlight the immediately practical nature of this being and its 
ontological dependence on our activity (Heidegger, 1992: 44). Dasein is basically 
“able to be”. Humankind is freedom. This necessary freedom is not a property of 
Dasein, but the very being of its existence, what can be called its transcendence. 
 
 
According to De Waelhens, moreover, we are completely mistaken, we engage in an 
impossible endeavour when we strive to provide for the being of Dasein an abstract 
and immutable definition to which it could be reduced. Therefore, also, one cannot 
say of Dasein that it exists, that it has existence, thinking of the scholastic sense of 
existentia. The existence type designated existentia is in no way that of Dasein. A thing 
is what it is, and remains stuck in itself. Its inertia and its total determinability are entirely 
opposed to the unstable existence of Dasein. All that Dasein is or may be is 
characterized by its uncertainty and proves to be dependent on possibilities of which 
he (Dasein) alone will decide. Dasein will be what he will have resolved to be, he is 
self-determination (De Waelhens, 1971:27). 
 
 
However, when we say that the essence of Dasein is in its existence, it means that it 
exists necessarily or that it essentially belongs to it to be and that Dasein cannot be 
provided with an abstract and universally valid definition, since what it is lies in the how, 
freely chosen, of its existence. Dasein exists in such a way that it is understood from 
its existential possibilities. Dasein is his possibility. He always presents himself under 
the species of the ego. This ego, however, is neither a substance nor a pure subjectivity 
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free from any relation with anything else, as idealism desires (De Waelhens, 1971: 
30). 
 
 
Therefore, Dasein is the one who: 
 
 
 
through the variation of behaviours and experiences, maintains himself 
(sic) as identical and remains related to this multiplicity. Ontologically, we 
understand him (sic) as the being-there-in-front stands each time already 
and constantly in a given area, circumscribed, where it has place, as what 
stands at the base in a privileged sense, as the subjectum 
(Heidegger,1992: 156). 
 
 
In accordance with Jacob, Dasein is a being-there-in-front. It is always this sense 
of ‘being’ that is involved when one's being remains undetermined. ‘Being-in-front’ is, 
however, the kind of ‘being’ of a being that is of the order of Dasein. The latter is the 
only one who is capable of understanding and interpreting the meaning of being from 
a presupposition or pre-comprehension that he has always already implicitly as an 
existence, which is none other than "the being that we ourselves precisely are”. The 
link of this implicit understanding of being, that of its possible explication into a true 
interpretation of being, is none other than that of this being, which is in the mode of 
the ‘being-there’ of the interpretation of the meaning of being, namely the Da of the 
Dasein (Jacob, 1990:898). Above all, for Dreyfus and Sreekumar Nellickappilly, 
commenting on Heidegger, Dasein is the name of a certain entity- the human being - 
he (Heidegger) more properly uses it to designate the being of that entity, in which 
case it is equivalent to the term "existence” or “human existence” (Galt-Crowell, 
1993: 375; Nellickappilly, 2017: 1). That conception of Dasein as human existence 
is also assumed by Von Herrmann, when he states: 
 
 
 
Accordingly, Dasein is a pure expression of being, an expression for being, 
in terms of which and in respect to which the being having an understanding 
of being is designated as “Dasein.” In this way, the designation “Dasein” 
moves close to the concept of existence as the being of beings that 
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understands being. For like existence, “Dasein” also has to do with the being 
of the being designated as Dasein (Von Herrmann, 2011: 214). 
 
 
Since Dasein is related to I myself and there are many others like myself, it is logical 
that there is a plurality of Dasein. 
 
 
 
3.5.2  The plurality of Dasein 
Dasein is I. Mine belongs of itself to Dasein (Heidegger, 1992: §12).  In George 
Steiner’s view, Dasein is ‘being,’ which questions being, by first questioning its own 
Sein. Man is man because he is a being–there (Steiner, 1987: 80). It is not a being, 
given once and for all, and possessing qualities. It is simple. It should be remembered 
that there is no pure consciousness detached from the world because Dasein is to be 
there (da-sein), and there is the world: the concrete, literal, actual, daily world (Steiner, 
1987: 81). According to Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is an essential state of the 
Dasein’s ‘being’ […]. Dasein is a ‘being-in-the–world with other’s’. Therefore, Dasein 
is being-with and Dasein-with (Mitsein und Mitdasein) (Heidegger, 1980: 80/149). This 
is a new fact of primary importance. Indeed, the world is not only populated with 
utensils, it includes beings who, like me, are Dasein, who like me are each a ‘being-in-
the-world’. These "others" accompany me, and contrariwise the utensils serve me. The 
others are mitsein. The "others" are not what remains of humanity apart from myself. 
They do not oppose my I-hood (Heidegger, 1980:152), they are therefore those whom, 
at first sight, one does not distinguish, but those among whom I am also (Heidegger, 
1992: 160). To be more precise, Heidegger affirms that the others already are there 
with us in being- in-the-world (Heidegger, 1980: 152). 
 
 
They are existential, insofar as they are constituents of the being of my existence. 
My being itself is an existence in common with the other. The world I live in, I 
share with others. That is to say, the world of Dasein is a shared world. This 
world is a Mitwelt (Heidegger, 1992: 160). To exist is for mankind to exist with other 
human beings. Heidegger insists on this and states that: 
 
 
Being-in-the-world is the basic state of Dasein by which every mode of its 
Being gets co-determined… And the Dasein of Others is encountered 
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within-the-world. By others we do not mean everyone else but me - those 
over against whom the I stands out (Heidegger, 1980: 153-154). 
 
 
In any case, we do not conclude the existence of the other; the other accompanies 
us in a world from which he is inseparable. Others, in fact, participate closely in my 
existence because Dasein is fundamentally and ultimately to be-in-common. 
 
On the other hand, misanthropy, or the absence of the neighbour, as an absence is 
only meaningful in a Mitsein. We speak of absence only where the presence of others 
is right. There is solitude only relative to the possible presence of others. As an 
illustration, I can be alone in the middle of a crowd; this is a peremptory proof that the 
true presence of the other is not reducible to the de facto fact of a material 
neighbourhood, but that it is based on being-in-common. It is in this order of ideas 
that it is logical to say that the solitary exists according to a deficient mode of Mitsein 
(Heidegger, 1992: 163). 
 
 
The Dasein who is fundamentally in the world, must necessarily be concerned about 
this world. The world in the work of Heidegger is: 
 
 
Always the one that I have with others. In this sense, the world of Dasein 
is a with-world (Mitwelt) and Being-in is being-with others. That is to say, 
their Being-in-themselves-within-the-world is Dasein-with (Mit-dasein). The 
world is where concernfully Dasein dwells essentially (Heidegger, 1980: 
155). 
 
 
The world is a system of modifiable relationships. The world co-implies a priori and 
necessarily the possibility of the game, which is precisely the space of the world. The 
worldhood (mundanity) of the world is to be seen as referential totality, which 
constitutes significance (Heidegger, 1980: 160). In other words as Suvak states: 
 
 
Dasein is not simply self-consciousness, but mainly and fundamentally is 
conscious of itself or conscious of itself as being (-in-the-world). Being-in-
62 
 
the-world is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein and co-original with 
this openness to its own being is an openness to other beings as well as 
the being of other beings (Suvak, 2000: 4). 
 
 
From this, it becomes clear that Dasein, which is fundamentally being-in-common, 
can care about others because Dasein in itself is essentially being-with and even 
Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1980: 156-157). The 
attitude of Dasein towards others is defined by concern towards others. In this sense, 
the attitude of Dasein towards itself is solicitude (Heidegger, 1980: 158). 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has emphasized the notion of ‘being’ as one of the key concepts of Martin 
Heidegger. The question of ‘being’ has been overshadowed in the history of Western 
metaphysics because all philosophy after Parmenides has lost sight of the ontological 
difference and hence the confusion of ‘being’ and beings. To put it simply, all Western 
philosophy has thought of ‘being’ only in terms of beings by forgetting nothingness, 
since being itself is unveiling and veiling at the same time. 
 
Drawing parallels between ‘being and truth’, we have said that the latter, contains 
in itself untruth. It is therefore in the very essence of truth that it also implies non-
truth. The forgetting of ‘being’ having reached its climax, we have therefore 
justified the surpassing of metaphysics by a new question, which would take into 
account the problem of nothingness. Given that there are several beings, we have 
pointed out the primacy of one of these beings, who is Dasein and who alone has 
the capacity to question his being, to understand. But then how do we understand? 
This is the task of our last chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ONTOLOGY OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The question of epistemological understanding discussed in the previous chapter 
allows us to approach understanding in its ontological sense. More explicitly, our 
cogitations here gather around the interrogation, which bears on the mode of being 
of this being which exists in understanding. This is the turning point Heidegger made 
in hermeneutics. To better highlight, the ontological understanding, our remarks will 
have four points. We will start from the analysis of the world. Then we will try to clarify 
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what Heidegger means by the anticipation structures of understanding, to lay bare his 
notion of understanding that extends to interpretation (the third point). Finally, we will 
end with language, which is nothing other than the articulation of explicitation 
(explicitness). 
 
4.2  The world and the tools 
There is a fundamental link between the world and mundane things (Magid, 2015: 
451). Dasein is a being-in-the-world, in the sense that the world constitutes the 
beingness of Dasein because it cannot live without the world. Commenting on 
Heidegger, George Steiner asserts: “the world comes at us… in the form and manner 
of things” (Steiner, 1987: 8; See also Heidegger, 1980: 92). It follows that Dasein 
encounters mundane things or inner-wordly beings within the world. This is why it 
is necessary to specify what we mean by world and by tools (mundane things). 
 
4.2.1  The world 
The notion of the “world” is of paramount importance if one wants to make a serious 
study of Dasein because the latter cannot be understood apart from it. Dasein 
maintains relations with the world and other inner-worldly beings. From the ontological 
point of view, the world is not a character of being, but it is an existential (Vattimo, 
1985: 32). This link can be discovered etymologically. Dasein (Da-sein) means be 
there and “there” refers to the world in which Dasein dwells. A similar argument made 
by Heidegger gives four connotations to the concept of “world”. He affirms that world 
can signify: 
 
 
Firstly, “world” is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality of 
those entities, which can be present-at-hand within the world. Secondly, 
“world” functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being [sic] of 
those entities which we have just mentioned. And indeed “world” can 
become a term for any realm which encompasses a multiplicity of entities: 
for instance, when one talks of the “world” of a mathematician, “world” 
signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics. Thirdly, “world” can 
be understood in another ontical sense - not, however, as those entities 
which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-
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world, but rather as that “wherein” a factical Dasein as such can be said to 
“live”. “World” has here a pre-ontological existentiell signification. Here 
again there are different possibilities: “world” may stand for the “public” we-
world, or one’s “own” closest (domestic) environment. Finally, “world” 
designates the ontologicoexistential concept of worldhood. Worldhood 
itself may have as its mode whatever structural wholes any special “world” 
may have at the time; but it embraces in itself the a priori character of 
worldhood in general (Heidegger, 1980: 93). 
 
 
For Heidegger, “ontologically, the world…is a characteristic of Dasein itself” 
(Heidegger, 1980: 92). Additionally to what is mentioned above, Levinas states: 
 
To understand being is to exist in such a way that one takes care of one’s 
own existence. To understand is to take care […] The phenomenon of 
world or, more precisely, the structure of being-in-the-world presents the 
precise form in which this understanding of being is realised (Levinas et 
al., 1996: 18). 
 
 
If this thesis could be justified, the exit of oneself (self-examination) sortie de soi to 
the world would be integrated with the existence of Dasein, because the 
understanding of being, we already know, is a mode of existence. It is given in the 
form it goes from existence, as the fundamental characteristic of the finitude of 
Dasein (Levinas et al., 1996). It is on the finitude of the existence of Dasein that its 
transcendence towards the world is founded. In other words, being-in-the-world is by 
no means the subject of which modern philosophy speaks because this notion 
presupposes precisely that the subject is something which opposes an object 
understood as simple-presence. Being there is never something closed, which would 
be necessary, but it is always already and constitutively related to the world (Vattimo, 
1985: 40). In a similar way, Heidegger affirms that, “the notion of existential identity 
and that of world are completely wedded. To be at all is to be worldly” (Steiner, 1987: 
83). It is further noted that the world from Heidegger’s point of view is diametrically 
opposed to the idealist rationalism of Descartes, who conceived the opposition 
between the subject (ego cogitans) and nature (world) as res extensa. For Heidegger, 
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consequently, to know the world, for Dasein, is not knowledge, but rather a mode of 
living in the world (Heidegger, 1980: 95). 
 
 
What Heidegger puts in place of the usual conception of the world is something that 
makes it possible. This justification process serves as proof. The phenomenon of the 
world, as Heidegger describes it, will join or explain the classical opinion, which does 
not always start from initial or authentic phenomena. 
 
 
For Levinas, the common conception is that the world is equivalent to all the things 
discovered by knowledge. Indeed, things, if we stick to the concrete meaning of their 
appearance for us, are in the world. Any appearance of a particular thing assumes 
the world. It is from the atmosphere that things solicit us. What meaning can we give 
to this reference to the world that phenomenological analysis must not leave out of 
consideration and erase? It reveals itself, in the first analysis, as closely related 
to Dasein, the atmosphere that Dasein lives in; it is as such that we say our world, 
the world of an era, of an artist, etc. This invites us to search in the mode of existence 
of Dasein itself the phenomenon of the world, which will thus appear as an ontological 
structure. The atmosphere of the surrounding world is not the naked and abstract 
spatiality of the world, but its reference to the existence of Dasein. The latter is a being 
characterised by an essential commitment in a world, which can discover a fact such 
as the atmosphere, from which an infinitely poorer concept like space, acquires a 
meaning. Anthropologists say it better when they deal with the relationship that Dasein 
has with the world: man inhabits the world and the latter inhabits him (Levinas et 
al., 1996: 22). 
 
 
 
The world is also where Dasein is thrown. Similarly, Steiner asserts: 
 
 
We are “thrown” (geworfen) into the world, proclaims Heidegger. Our 
being-in-the-world is a “throwness”, a Geworfenheit. There is nothing 
mystical nor metaphysical about this proposition. It is primordial banality, 
which metaphysical speculation has long overlooked. The world into which 
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we are thrown, without personal choice, with no previous knowledge […] 
was there before us and will be there after us (Steiner, 1987: 85). 
 
 
As said previously, in the third chapter, Dasein is already always a Mitsein, therefore 
the world of Dasein is a shared world. To sum up, “World [sic] is nothing other than 
this “in-view-of-itself”, where Dasein is involved with its own existence and in relation 
to which the encounter with the handleable came about” (Levinas et al., 1996: 22). 
 
4.2.2  Tools (work-tools) 
Let us start from the ambient world to determine the mood, to describe the worldhood 
or mundanity of the world according to the expression of Heidegger. The things with 
which Dasein exists are, above all, objects of care and solicitude. They are offered 
by hand, they invite handling. In addition, they are used for something: axes to split 
wood, hammers to hammer iron, handles to open doors, houses to shelter us etc […]. 
They are, in the broadest sense of the term, tools, outillage, equipment or 
instrumentation (Heidegger, 1985b: 393; Levinas et al., 1996: 19; Steiner, 1987: 86-
87). 
 
 
What is their mode of being? The being of the utensil does not identify itself with that 
of a mere material object, revealing itself to perception or science. Contemplation 
cannot grasp the utensil as such. “The purely contemplative gaze, however penetrating 
it may be, thrown on the aspect of this or that thing cannot discover a tool” (Heidegger, 
1992: 69). Additionally, Heidegger thinks that it is by use, by handling that we access 
it in an adequate and entirely original way. It is at this level especially that Heidegger 
opposes the current opinion, shared by Husserl, that before handling, we must 
represent what we handle (Heidegger, 1980: 105). 
 
Thus understood, tools are objects that Dasein discovers by a certain mode of its 
existence:  handling. They are not simply things. In this regard, Vattimo comments, 
Heidegger says that the things we encounter in the world are instruments before being 
mere presences, realities endowed with objective existence (Vattimo, 1985: 32). The 
same argument is made by Levinas who states: 
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Tools are thus objects that Dasein reveals by a given mode of its existence- 
handling. Tools are not then simply “things”. Handling is in some way the 
affirmation of their being. Handling determines not what tools are but the 
manner in which they encounter Dasein, the manner in which they are. 
The being of tools is “handlability” [maniabilité] (Zuhandenheit) (Levinas 
et al., 1996: 19). 
 
 
In a similar fashion, Vattimo assures us that handling is not a simple presence on 
which a new property would be grafted. It is entirely irreducible and original. In 
other words, the handlability of things, to know their meaning in relation to our 
life, is not something that adds to their objectivity, but constitutes their mode of 
being and gives them the most significant way they first appear in our experience 
(Vattimo, 1985: 32). It comes to light, as Levinas (1996) affirms: 
 
It (the handlability of tools) is essentially constituted by the “referral” 
[renvoi]. The tool is "in view of" [en vue de] something, because it is not a 
separate entity, but always in tandem with other tools. Its mode of being 
entails giving precedence to the totality of the function [oeuvre] in relation 
to which the tool exists. The tool is efficient in its role, and the handlability 
characterises its being “in itself” [soi]; it exists uniquely in its role in the case 
where handlability is not explicitly present but recedes into the 
background, and the tool is understood in terms of its functions. This 
function is itself instrumental: the shoe exists in order to be worn, the watch 
in order to tell the time. But, on the other hand, the productive function 
makes use of something in a view of something. What is handlable then 
refers back to materials (Levinas et al., 1996: 20). 
 
It is clear from the above quotation that, through tools, we see the forest as wood, water 
as hydroelectric power. All those tools constitute the world as the totality of things 
(Levinas et al., 1996: 20). Additionally to the above, it is simply on their handleability 
that those tools are considered because they (tools) are not prima facie in themselves. 
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They are always connected with us as instruments. Their being is radically and 
constitutively related to their being in the project of being (Vattimo, 1985: 33). 
 
 
 
To sum up this section with Levinas, we can say that Dasein encounters tools in its 
everyday life. Accordingly, Levinas’ point of view, “being, for Dasein is to understand 
being. To understand being is to exist in such a manner that "existence itself is at stake” 
(Levinas et al., 1996: 22). So in the next section, before analysing understanding itself, 
we will explore first the fore-structures of understanding, which lead to understanding. 
 
 
 
4.3  Fore-structures of understanding 
By fore-structures of understanding, we mean what precedes us as being thoughtful: 
prejudice, authority and tradition. We will limit ourselves to these three structures. 
These structures are the ground on which any understanding is based. A similar 
argument is made by Ka-Wing Leung who affirms: “The interpreting of something as 
something, or the making explicit of something that is understood, is in turn achieve 
on the basis of another structure, the structure that Heidegger calls “fore-structure” 
(Heidegger cited by Leung, 2010: 26). 
 
 
 
4.3.1  Prejudice 
According to common sense, prejudice means a judgment made before the final 
consideration of all material determinants of the merits. In the practice of justice, it 
means legal decision prior to the judgment itself. Prejudice also means judgment error. 
It should be noted that it is from the Aufklarung (romantic enlightenment), especially 
with Cartesian doubt, that the concept of prejudice has received the negative meaning 
that is familiar to us (Gadamer, 1996: 291; Gadamer 2004: 274). Similarly, Paul 
Regan, commenting on Gadamer, asserts: 
 
 
The term praejudicium refers to judgements, pre-supposition, bias, 
prejudices from cultural traditions, whether positive or negative. They are 
necessary springboards towards better understanding where even vague 
notions of a text’s meaning are important because they ensure the 
70 
 
familiarity of words and ‘construal’ of its meaning. The ‘expectation’ of what 
has been experienced before gives the interpreter a working hypothesis 
from which to further develop understanding (Gadamer, cited by Regan, 
2012: 296). 
 
 
In fact, prejudice is often due to the prestige of the interlocutor or the authority he or 
she enjoys and especially by the precipitation that resides in the subject himself or 
herself. Authority becomes a source of prejudice because among moderns, the 
ultimate source of all authority is not tradition, but reason. 
 
 
It is noted here that writing, in this context, has an authoritarian character because 
the possibility that a written thing is not true is not easy to achieve. What is written 
has the palpable character of what can be shown. However, the general tendency of 
theAufklarung is to admit no authority and to submit everything to the court of reason 
(Gadamer, 1996: 297). The Enlightenment thinkers are the ones who limited the 
meaning of prejudice in their critique of religion to unfounded judgement (Leung, 
2010: 33). However, from Gadamer’s point of view, the overcoming of all prejudices 
is itself only another prejudice whose mere revision opens the way for an appropriate 
understanding of the finitude that dominates not only our being but also our historical  
 
 
consciousness. Long before self-understanding through reflection on the past, we 
understand ourselves spontaneously in the family, society and state where we live. 
The awareness of the individual by himself or herself is only a trembling light in the 
closed circle of the current of historical life. Thus, the prejudices and also the 
judgments of the individual form the historical reality of his or her being (Gadamer, 
1996: 298). 
 
We think the prejudice understood in Gadamer’s way is what is called jurisprudence 
in law. As justice reasons with the finite historical character of the human being, it 
becomes imperative to rehabilitate prejudices and recognize their legitimacy. 
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4.3.2  Authority 
As we said above, authority is the source of prejudices according to the romantic 
enlightenment. It opposes freedom and reason. In this context, it means blind 
obedience. Nevertheless, in its essence, authority, in Gadamer’s view, has nothing 
to do with an act of submission and abdication of reason. On the contrary, it is rooted 
in an act of recognition and knowledge. Judgment requires acknowledgment that the 
other is superior in judgment and insight, and his or her judgment prevails over ours, 
and has pre-eminence over ours (Gadamer, 1996: 300). Authority does not receive 
itself. It is acquired by anyone who claims. It is based on an act of reason which 
admits its limits and which gives others greater sagacity. 
 
 
 
In its true sense, authority maintains no commerce with obedience to a given order. 
It does not have a direct relationship to obedience because it is very tied to 
knowledge. The character of giving orders and being obeyed that recognizes 
authority is not the essence, but the consequence of the authority that someone has. 
It is in this sense, that the authority of a superior who commands has its true 
foundation in an act of freedom and reason, or because he or she sees things from 
above, or because he or she is an expert, he or she carries it to knowledge (Gadamer, 
1996: 301). The underlying idea of authority is recognition that what it says is not 
unreasonable or arbitrary. It is at this precise point that the meaning of the authority 
is claimed by the educator (Magister dixit), the supervisor, the specialist. In short, 
authority belongs to tradition.  
 
 
 4.3.3  Tradition 
All that tradition and custom have consecrated has authority. Moreover, our finite 
historical being is by tradition, which has always influenced our action and our 
behaviour. All education is based on tradition. Tradition as understood by Gadamer 
as something long-established, persistent, and constantly repeated (Gadamer cited 
by Leung, 2010: 34). Traditions are freely assumed, but not created and founded in 
their validity by a free discernment. From this perspective, tradition is needed without 
having been founded in advance. 
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However, with the Age of Enlightenment the concept of tradition has become 
ambiguous and opposed to reasonable freedom. Gadamer, for his part, thinks there 
is no absolute contrast between tradition and reason. For tradition itself bears some 
elements that relate to freedom and history itself (Gadamer, 1996: 302). It should be 
remembered that tradition is essentially conservation, which is at work in any 
historical transformation. Since conservation is an act of reason, even though it often 
goes unnoticed, tradition cannot be in opposition to reason. Even if the innovation 
and the reasoned project are seen as the way of acting of the only reason, it appears 
that even in the ongoing world, in a revolutionary period, there is always something 
that is preserved, a part of the past, much more considerable than one thinks, that is 
conserved and recovers authority in allying with what is new (Gadamer, 1996: 303). 
 
 
This is why our excursion into the topic of “tradition” is not an objectifying behaviour 
that would take tradition as something foreign. It must be considered as something 
that is in us, recognition of ourselves. From this perspective, understanding is an 
insertion into a traditional process, where the past and the present are constantly 
interfering. As pointed out above, Dasein is always already being-in-the-world, that is 
our thrownness (Steiner, 1987: 85) in the world. It is the sense that we can understand 
our insertion in the tradition. In line with all the above, Paul Regan justifies and affirms: 
 
The profound concept of historicity and understanding is that we are thrown 
into a world that has a historical context, which becomes better understood 
as Dasein matures in time. We are composed of this world and context, 
our essence is already in this all surrounding and ancient world, temporally 
and unavoidably not of our own making. We are born with a past even as 
we begin to know we exist and have the ability to think and wonder, 
adapting to the world as it is. This is evident by the phrase the ‘biological 
clock’ which ticks away long before we are aware of our own mortality. 
Therefore, we study history in so far as we ourselves are historical. This 
reduces the risk of being self absorbed and forgetting about history whilst 
also allowing us to remain naive and re-present the past into the present 
and future (Gadamer, cited by Regan, 2012: 298). 
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In short, let us sum up this section by affirming with Leung that: “the ultimate aim of 
Gadamer’s consecutive moves from prejudice to authority and from authority to 
tradition is to demonstrate that tradition, or “belonging to a tradition” is the condition 
of understanding” (Leung, 2010: 34). 
 
 
 
4.4  The existential triad 
Under this subsection, focusing on the existential triad, the discussion will be mainly 
based on the feeling of the situation, understanding and interpretation. 
 
 
 
4.4.1 The feeling of the situation (Sentiment de la situation) 
Dasein, as being-in-the-world, finds himself or herself firstly thrown into the world, 
secondly projected in its possibilities and finally fallen in everyday life (inauthentic 
life). The feeling of the situation has no linguistic character. It remains and is 
understood only as the feeling of the situation. Dasein is understood in a certain 
affective disposition. It stands here already affecting in a determined way. It is this 
phenomenon, at first sight banal, that classical psychology takes an interest in by 
insisting on the tone or the affective colour that is mixed with any state of 
consciousness: good or bad mood, joy, boredom, fear. For Heidegger, these 
dispositions are not states, but modes of understanding oneself to be there 
(Heidegger, 1992: 178-180; Levinas et al., 1996: 23). 
 
 
To Heidegger, the disposition is a kind of existential being of the co-original open-
world, of coexistence and existence, because it is itself essentially being-in-the-world. 
It is a fundamental existential mode in which Dasein is there. The arrangement is not 
only an ontological characteristic of Dasein, but because of what it discovers and has, 
at the same time, the significance of a methodological principle for existential analysis 
(Heidegger, 1992: 184). 
 
 
The affective disposition does not detach itself from the understanding by which it 
exists, revealing to us the fact that Dasein is doomed to those possibilities. It is neither 
the symbol, nor the symptom, nor the index of this situation; it is its situation. The 
description of affectivity does not prove the reality but it provides the analysis that 
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shows by its existence, Dasein is already thrown in the middle of its possibilities.  
In other words, as Levinas affirms: “to exist for man is to seize his own possibilities 
[…]. The intimacy of this relation between Dasein and its possibilities that is 
characterized […] by the fact of being its possibilities. To-be-in-the-world is to be one’s 
possibilities” (Levinas et al., 1996: 23-24).  It should be noted that thrownness, or 
dereliction, is understood in the sense of the source and the necessary foundation of 
affectivity, this being possible only where existence is delivered to one's own destiny 
(Levinas et al., 1996: 24). 
 
 
 
For Heidegger, dereliction, abandonment to imposed possibilities, gives to human 
existence a de facto character in a very strong and very dramatic sense of the term. 
The empirical facts of science are imposed on a spirit. However, to be ascertained 
as facts, a situation such as effectiveness must first be there. This situation is fulfilled 
by a Dasein who exists in its Da, his here below, and is thrown into the world. To be 
thrown into the world, abandoned and left to oneself, is the ontological description of 
the fact. Human existence is defined for Heidegger by this "effectivity" or "facticity". 
The understanding and interpretation of this effectiveness constitute the analytic 
ontology of Dasein itself for us. This is why the author of On the Way to Language 
(Acheminement vers la parole) and his followers define ontology as “the hermeneutics 
of facticity” (Heidegger, 1976: 96; Heidegger cited by Levinas et al., 1996: 24). 
 
 
For Levinas, understanding of possibilities by Dasein is done in its dereliction, as an 
understanding of the possible.  Commenting on Heidegger, Levinas affirms: 
 
 
Dasein is always already beyond itself. But being thus beyond oneself -to 
be one's possibilities- does not mean, as we have already said, to 
contemplate this beyond as an object, to choose between possibilities as 
we choose between two paths that intersect at a crossroads. This would 
be to deprive possibility of its character of possibility by transforming it into 
a plan established beforehand. Possibility must be seized in its very 
possibility - as such it is inaccessible to contemplation but positively 
characterizes the way of the being of Dasein. This way of being thrown 
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forward toward one's own possibilities, of adumbrating [esquisser] them 
throughout one's very existence, is a crucial moment of understanding, 
which Heidegger defines by the word Entwurf, which we translate as 
"project-in-draft" [projetesquisse] (Levinas et al., 1996: 24). 
 
 
 
Furthermore, Dasein is not always in its authentic life but can fall to its everyday life. 
In this inauthentic life, Dasein becomes alienated by its possibilities and by other 
Daseins. “This phenomenon is called “fall”, the third characteristic of existence 
alongside dereliction and the project-in-draft” (Levinas et al., 1996: 25). The fall, as 
described by Heidegger is: 
 
 
A mode of the existence of Dasein shunning its authentic existence in order 
to relapse into everyday life [vie quotidienne] (Alltäglichkeit). Dasein does 
not understand itself in its true personality but in terms of the object it 
handles: it is what it does, it understands itself in virtue of the social role it 
professes. We have not been able to insist on the character of Dasein by 
virtue of which it understands other persons, by virtue of which it coexists. 
We make the point here to say that in "everyday life" this coexistence 
becomes equally commonplace; it is reduced to superficial social relations, 
which are entirely determined by handling in common [maniement en 
commun], other persons being understood as one understands oneself, in 
terms of things. Dasein, fallen, is lost in things and knows another 
personality only as "the one" [1'on] or "everyone" [tout le monde]. It 
understands itself - and this term always means it is its possibilities - with 
an optimism which is nothing other than a flight in the face of anguish, that 
is, in the face of its authentic understanding. (Heidegger, 1992: 131). 
 
 
 
It is further noted that in the fall, states Heidegger, “we rediscover all the structures of 
understanding in an altered and fallen form. The word, whose union with 
understanding we will demonstrate later, and which authentic Dasein possesses 
under the modality of silence, becomes chatter  and verbiage, introducing 
equivocation into existence” (Heidegger cited by Levinas et al., 1996: 25). 
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Nevertheless, as being-in-the-world, being-there has not always only some 
understanding of the totality of meanings, but also always has a certain emotional tone. 
In other words, things are not always theoretically sensible. They have emotional 
value. It is by taking account of affectivity that existential analysis is endowed with a 
guard against the risk of privileging an aspect of being there in favour of the others, 
since philosophy has often favoured the theoretical or cognitive aspect by 
neglecting the emotional aspect. 
 
 
Finally, the feeling of the situation allows Heidegger to take a decisive step in the 
development of his thought. The situatedness of being does go hand in hand with 
understanding. This situatedness is a kind of fore-structure of understanding, more 
original than understanding (Heidegger, cited by Vattimo, 1985: 42). 
 
 
 
 4.4.2  Understanding 
Understanding is a fundamental existential. Indeed, in all the behaviours by which 
being is in commerce with beings, there is always an understanding of the being of 
being-there. It is, moreover, what being knows where it is himself or herself, and it also 
reveals being itself as being-in-the-world in the structure of in order of whom, which 
defines it as revelation (Ndumba, 1988: 58). In line with all the above, Leung 
commenting on Heidegger says: 
 
 
Heidegger intends to use the term “understanding” in a sense that he 
supposes to be the original or primary sense to mean a “fundamental 
existentiale”… In this sense, understanding is “the condition of possibility 
for all of Dasein’s particular possible manners of comportment” (Leung, 
2010: 24). 
 
 
The opening of the world to Dasein in the form of "in order to", on the one hand, and of 
significance, on the other hand, is to understand it as an existential, a condition of 
possibility of any other mode of knowing. It is in this sense that Heideggerian 
understanding should be understood as the potentiality-for-being, which is also being 
77 
 
of an inalienable being – being of beings, while at the same time being-in-the-world 
(Heidegger, 1992: 180). 
 
The Heideggerian concept of understanding is original and different from the ordinary 
meaning of this word, which refers to the ontic. This understanding is not an intellectual 
faculty of being-there, which would be, moreover, the gift of power over this or that. 
The knowledge we are talking about here is not to be reduced to a purely conceptual 
understanding. This understanding is not theoretical because it is a mode both simpler 
and more original, such as the comprehension of grasping a being such as a hammer 
as a tool for nailing (Heidegger, 1985b: 393). We will have in the next sections to 
analyze understanding as a worrying quest of Dasein, understanding as potentiality 
for- being and understanding as a way of living, to highlight the entire existential 
dimension of the latter. 
 
 
 
4.4.2.1  Understanding as anguish of Dasein 
Anguish (anxiety) is one of the essential ontological dispositions. This is understood 
in both a theological (in relation to sin and fault) and a psychological (as a state of 
mind) sense, from Kierkegaard’s point of view. The latter links anguish to the 
experience of dealing with its many possibilities.  He states: “the relationship of 
freedom to fault is anxiety because freedom and fault are still possible” (Kierkegaard, 
2015: 112).  However, to Freud, anguish is precisely that which is peculiar and familiar 
to us, but which we have repressed to preserve ourselves from something or to obey 
civilising demands. It refers to what the second topic will circumscribe under the term 
‘that’ (Freud, 2001: 252, 258). However, Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of 
anguish takes it from psychology to ontology (Heidegger, 1992: § 40). 
 
 
To Ciocan, Heidegger before analysing anguish, took his time to prepare us by 
explaining what fear is in order to distinguish these two dispositions of affectivity. He 
affirms this by stating: 
 
Heidegger is interested to unveil the structure of anxiety and its capacity 
of revealing the totality of Dasein’s being. But, in order to be able to clarify 
the structure of anxiety, Heidegger prefers to start by approaching a 
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neighbouring and more easy-describable mood, namely fear. Fear 
appears in Being and Time only to prepare the ground upon which a 
clearer and richer exposure of the structure and existential-ontological 
force of anxiety can possibly emerge (Ciocan, 2010: 66). 
 
 
The existence of Dasein, consisting in understanding being, grasped as "being-in-the-
world", is specified as existence, including in the state of dereliction, its fundamental 
possibility of existing. What is this understanding that captures Dasein as the ultimate 
achievement and accomplishment of this effectiveness? 
 
According to Levinas, anguish is an affective understanding. He affirms: 
 
 
This mode of understanding is anguish. Every understanding comes about 
in an affective disposition. Affectivity, such as joy, fear, or sadness, is 
characterized- a point we have not stressed until now - by its double 
direction: toward an object [vers un objet] (Wovor) that is in the world, and 
toward itself, toward the one "for whom" [pour qui] (Worum) one is grieved, 
happy, or frightened. This taking stock of itself, fundamental for affectivity, 
shows moreover in the reflected form of verbs that express affective states 
 
- being delighted, frightened, saddened, etc (Levinas et al., 1996: 29; 
Huneman and Kulich, 1997: 60). 
 
 
According to Levinas (1996), anguish has the same structure as fear, but offers 
a peculiarity that sets it apart among affective states. He affirms that: 
 
We must first distinguish it (anguish) from fear. The one “for whom” we are 
frightened is “ourselves”; it is Dasein attained and threatened in its “being-
in- the-world”. On the other hand, the object of fear, we encounter the 
object of fear in the world by virtue of a determined being (être). It is 
different for anguish: the object of anguish is not in the interior of the world 
like a "menacing thing" [quelque chose de menaçant] about which one must 
make this or that decision. The object of anguish remains entirely 
indeterminate. Indeterminacy is in no way purely negative: specific and 
original, it reveals to us a sort of indifference that all the objects usually 
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handled by Dasein possess for anguished Dasein. Anguish presents a way 
of being in which the nonimportance, the insignificance, the nothingness 
of all inner worldly [intra mondains] (innerweltlich) objects becomes 
accessible to Dasein. In passing, let us make a point that should not be 
forgotten: we say that anguish reveals to us the insignificance of "inner 
worldly" objects; this does not mean that it acts as a sign for us, that we 
deduce this insignificance from the fact of anguish, or that we prove 
anguish after having taken note of the nonimportance of things. Anguish 
itself reveals and understands this insignificance. Moreover, correlatively, 
this insignificance is not revealed as something innocuous, a sort of purely 
theoretical negation and theoretically conceivable, but as essentially 
anguishing and, as a consequence, as taking leave of the domain of 
Dasein, as something human (Levinas et al., 1996: 30). 
 
 
However, with inner worldly objects sunk into nothingness, the anguished Dasein 
does not lose its constitution of being-in-the-world. Quite the contrary, anguish brings 
Dasein back to the world as a world - to the possibility of being in sight of oneself – it 
only tears it out of the world as a whole of things, handy utensils. In anguish, Dasein 
understands in an authentic way, brought back to the bare possibility of its existence, 
to its pure and simple effectiveness emptied of all contents, nothingness. It is this 
effectiveness of the being-in-the-world, of the pure and simple Da, which is the object 
of the anxiety, which threatens (Heidegger, 1992: §40). 
 
 
The object of anguish is identified with its for whom: it is being-in-the-world. In doing 
away with inner worldly things, anxiety makes it impossible to understand oneself 
from the possibilities relating to these objects, and it thus brings Dasein to understand 
itself from itself, it brings it back to oneself. Anguish, by bringing existence back to 
itself, saves it from its dispersion in things and reveals to Dasein its possibility of 
existing in a particularly acute way as being-in-the-world. It constitutes the situation 
where the totality of the ontological structures of Dasein is collected in unity. In other 
words, anguish is not absolutely an experience in which Dasein deals with a being: 
on the contrary, it is his own being in the world, which is revealed to him in his 
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dimension of being in dereliction (Huneman and Kulich, 1997: 62; Magrini, 2006: 77; 
Vietta, 1951: 170). A similar argument is observed by Ciocan who states: 
 
 
Fear is a mood that emerges in the face of something definite, a menacing 
entity within-the-world, one that is approaching me in a threatening way, 
one that menaces from a definite direction and with definite perils. Anxiety, 
on the other hand, emerges in the face of ‘something’ indefinite and assails 
‘something’ equally indefinite, namely, the being-in-the-world of Dasein as 
such. What is at issue is not an entity, not something concrete, but a 
nonentity, something distinct and different from any entity whatsoever. In 
other words, the ‘intentionality’ of anxiety is not focused on something 
determinate (Ciocan, 2010: 67). 
 
Anguish, let us repeat, is an understanding. It includes in an exceptional way the 
possibility to exist in an authentic way. Heidegger refers to the anguish that is a 
possibility of existing as a “worry” (Heidegger, 1992: § 41). 
 
The total formula expressing concern consists of these three elements: being-beyond 
oneself, having already been in the world, and being-close to things. Their unity is 
not that of a proposition that could always be arbitrarily established, but that of the 
concrete phenomenon of anxiety. Moreover, ontological understanding is not only 
understood as anguish. It is also potentiality-for-being (pouvoir-être), being 
impregnated from end to end with possibilities. 
 
 
 
4.4.2.2  Understanding as potentiality-for-being (Pouvoir-être) 
Being-in-the-world is a dynamic mode of existence. It is about dynamics, about 
possibility, not possibility in the logical and negative sense as "absence of 
contradiction" (empty possibility), but of the concrete and positive possibility, of that 
expressed by saying that we can do this or that, that we have possibilities towards 
which we are free. 
 
 
By understanding, Dasein can know where it is as to the possibility of being (Huneman 
and Kulich, 1997: 57). The tools that we discover in the world, these usable tools that 
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are useful for something, relate to our possibilities - seized or missed - to handle them, 
possibilities made possible by the fundamental possibility of being-in-the-world, that 
is, of existing for the very purpose of existence. This dynamic character of existence 
constitutes its fundamental paradox: existence is made of possibilities, which, 
however, precisely as possibilities, stand out in the forefront. Existence gets ahead 
of itself. 
 
 
 
To express the intimacy of this relationship between Dasein and its possibilities, we 
can say that it is characterised, not by the fact of having possibilities, but of being its 
possibilities; a structure which in the world of things would be inconceivable and which 
positively determines the existence of Dasein. Being-in-the-world means being one's 
possibilities. What are these possibilities? 
 
 
To be his possibilities is to understand them. But that does not mean a return to the 
notion of internal conscience. The originality of the Heideggerian conception of 
existence in relation to the traditional idea of an internal consciousness is that 
this knowledge of oneself, this internal illumination - this understanding - not only no 
longer admits the subject-object structure, but has nothing theoretical about it. It is 
not an awareness, a pure and simple observation of what we are, an observation 
capable of measuring our power over ourselves. Here, on the contrary, understanding 
is the very dynamism of this existence, this very power over oneself. In this sense, 
understanding constitutes the mode whose existence is its possibilities: what was 
taking consciousness becomes suddenly taken and, hence, the event of existence 
itself. Instead of the consciousness of traditional philosophy, which, as it becomes 
conscious, remains serene and contemplative external to the destiny and the history 
of the concrete man of which it becomes aware, Heidegger introduces the notion of 
Dasein including its possibilities, but which comprises, ipso facto his destiny, his 
existence here below. 
 
 
Additionally, being-there is in the world in the form of the project, which is a kind of 
guide, open to modifications and developments. The concept of the project, which 
defines the totality of the beingness of being, has a precise meaning here. It is 
understanding as a way of possessing all the meanings that make up the world before 
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meeting the particular things. All this is possible only because being-there is 
constitutively power-being and understanding of things is possible only by 
considering them as open possibilities (Vattimo, 1985: 39). 
 
 
4.4.2.3  Understanding as a way of life (savoir-être) 
To understand is always to apply. In this sense, understanding without application is 
not really understanding. It (understanding) is not a mechanical process, nor a matter 
of rules, nor a procedure, but ability, a power-being and a delicacy of the mind 
(Grondin, 1999: 154). 
 
Indeed, when we say that a work was done with "application" in French, it also means 
that it was executed with meticulousness and dedication. Here, then, there is insertion 
of the interpreter into what he understands. Understanding as vigilance is constitutive 
of the understanding of meaning, but it is also the correctness of understanding. It 
should be noted that this practical aspect of understanding is, without doubt, an 
Aristotelian heritage (Grondin, 1999: 155). As we said above, understanding is 
not theoretical knowledge, but especially practical. In other words, it is an ethos. 
 
 
For Jean Grondin, understanding as the mode of living of Dasein is also understood 
as situational knowledge that seems to be more often opposed to the calculation of 
who knows how to take advantage of the situation. This situational knowledge is 
relativistic and Kantian universalism. We will not elucidate this debate in this work. 
What is important to know here is that the former is not knowledge of pure speculation 
(intellection). It does not consist in knowing by the mind an ideal norm, an abstract 
good, a mathematical universality. It consists of applying the good in a concrete 
situation. It is rather knowledge as application (Grondin, 1999: 157). 
 
 
Situational knowledge, at a certain moment, becomes what is often called "moral 
action", which does not proceed from an objectivist conception, dependent on modern 
scientific objectification. It is knowledge as action and practical application. Aristotle 
was the first to propose this model in his ethics. His goal was to mark the limits of a 
strictly instrumental, epistemic or technical intelligence of the norms of action 
(Grondin, 1999: 158). Therefore, it is obvious that the mode of living as understanding 
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is indebted to a tradition, a fund that carries it. Moreover, this reference to ethos is 
not a plea for the relativism of acting or applying it to the hermeneutic of 
understanding, but has a function that admits that rightness does not depend on the 
detachment from the situation of the action in the same way as authoritative 
knowledge in the scientific and technical field. 
 
 
From this perspective, this knowledge does not belong to the order of the episteme 
whose model is provided for the Greeks by mathematics. It differs from technique, 
which is also the knowledge of a doing and which aims at the production of an object 
outside me. Know-how is not object knowledge and does not allow this distance. 
Whoever knows here is not confronted with a state of affairs that he or she would only 
notice. He or she is involved in what he or she knows. In other words, this knowledge 
is a capacity for discernment that is not a matter of objectification, but of vigilance, 
awakening to the situation. This is why, refusing to be objectified, knowledge cannot 
be learned as a mathematical knowledge (Grondin, 1999: 160). The best example of 
this knowledge is the case of a child who speaks and understands a language even 
though he or she does not know the grammatical rules of the language. 
 
 
 
4.4.3  Interpretation 
Being aware of possibilities is itself, through the backlash of these possibilities 
discovered in Dasein, a potentiality-for-being. The intrinsic pro-ject to hear it has the 
opportunity to develop. This development of hearing is called explicitness 
(Heidegger, 1992: 194). It is first an explanation, a development and disenchantment, 
a discovery, a surgery, an epiphany of understanding (Heidegger, 1992: 185). 
Moreover, the translation of Auslegung by interpretation has the great felicity of 
recalling that any worthy interpretation must first begin by a clarification of the 
possibilities of understanding, which determines it. Interpretation is not understood 
here first as the methodology of exegesis because the exegesis of things precedes 
that of texts (Kangudi, 2006). 
 
 
It should be pointed out that, in Heidegger's case, what is explicit is the one that 
attaches to the thing intended for one or another use. For, in the hermeneutic circle 
(Huneman and Kulich, 1997: 49), the pre-anticipation and the explicitness are tied 
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into a new structure called sense (Kangudi, 2006). It appears that it is when an 
innerworldly being has come to understanding that we say that it has a meaning. The 
latter is understood in many aspects: 
 
• the aspect of the entire referral system that controls the concern; 
• the aspect of articulation. This can be articulated in the constitutive revelation 
of understanding, what we call meaning. It is from there that it derives its formal 
aspect; 
• the aspect of anticipation. The meaning is the preconception of the project 
structured by the acquis, the prior view, the anticipation; 
• the existential aspect. If the meaning is always put in revelation with 
the discovery of a utensil and the revelation of the being that is projected, 
only the being-there can be sensible or not sensible. That is why the meaning 
remains constitutive of being-there; and 
• the circular aspect which stems from the symmetry between the agreement 
of the world on the one side and the existence of the other (Kangudi, 2006). 
 
 
To Heidegger, interpretation is a development of understanding. Heidegger himself 
explains this fact in his own words when he elaborates: 
 
The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility – that of 
developing itself. This development of the understanding we call 
“interpretation”. In it the understanding appropriates understandingly 
that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not 
become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is 
grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from 
the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what 
is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in 
understanding (Heidegger, 1980: 188-189). 
 
 
During interpretation, the enunciation of language does not reveal something new on 
the existential level; it only gives it an expression. Indeed, interpretation allows 
understanding to be seen as a revelatory power of being-in-the-world. The being-
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there, discovering the world in the ontological preoccupation of its structure of 
significance, from which inner worldly beings can understand each other explicitly, 
gives oneself to understand oneself. He discovers the world already understood, 
one explains it as such. 
 
Additionally, interpretation always culminates in appropriation because through 
interpretation we explain things in our words. It is in this sense that: 
 
 
“In it [interpretation] the understanding appropriates understandingly that 
which is understood by it.” This means that in interpretation we make into 
our own, into our property, what is in the first place foreign to us and does 
not belong to us. This character of interpretation is the most obvious in 
the case of translation, which, in Heidegger’s words, is “making what was 
presented in a foreign language accessible in our own language and for 
the sake of it (Heidegger, cited by Leung, 2010: 25). 
 
 
It should be noted that Verstehen and Auslegung do not constitute two different 
moments as if one had first the understanding of the given and then the explanation 
of its usable object. This expression "Verstehen and Auslegung" suggests a co-
originary structure of understanding and interpretation.  Interpretation is not a second 
moment, promising the self-realization of understanding in the schematization of 
meaning (Ndumba, 1988: 60). 
 
 
Appropriation is never a pure perception, a blank seizure of a pre-given subsistent 
being, since the explanation of something as this or that is based essentially on an 
acquired and a prior view and an anticipation, without reference to a world (Heidegger, 
1992: 188). What is articulable inside the découvrir ententif is the meaning. The latter 
covers the formal frame of what belongs by necessity to what the interpretation 
(explication ententive) is. 
 
 
Since hearing and interpretation form, on the one hand, the existential constitution of 
the being-there, meaning, on the other hand, is conceived as the formal existential 
frame of the opening inherent in hearing it. It is from this perspective that meaning is 
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an existential of Dasein. Only Dasein can, therefore, be charged with meaning or 
meaningless. In another register of language, the being of Dasein, and being 
discovered with him, can appropriate to each other in agreement or remain closed to 
each other by inentente. That is why, sticking to this existential-ontological 
interpretation, in its principle of the concept of meaning, everything that does not have 
the kind of being of Dasein must be conceived as foolish, as essentially meaningless. 
And only the fool can be a challenge to meaning (Heidegger, 1992: 197). 
 
 
 
The term hermeneutics, form Heidegger’s point of view, is a little more technical, and 
equivalent to the term explicitness. In Being and Time Heidegger defines the term in 
these words: “the phenomenology  of  Dasein  is  a  hermeneutic  in  the  primordial 
signification of this word, where it designates this business of interpreting” (Heidegger, 
 
1980: 62). 
 
 
 
In view of the above, it is easy to think that Heideggerian phenomenology is an 
interpretation because its express task is to recover the phenomenological way of 
the essential phenomenon of Dasein, against its own dissimulation. This is why being, 
that phenomenally does not show itself, is precisely this possible being (of which 
Dasein is nevertheless the constant concern). This is why to bring up to the surface 
in a way, to confront Dasein with his own being, it is therefore necessary to practice 
an explication or hermeneutics of Dasein (Heidegger, 1980: 63). 
 
 
To sum up this section, let us accept what Leung says about Heideggerian 
understanding and interpretation. He affirms: “Since Heidegger thinks that 
understanding underlies every comportment of Dasein, for him interpretation is at 
work in everything we think and do, everything we say and write” (Leung, 2010: 39). 
Besides, what is understood and interpreted has to be explained through the medium 
of language. On the same note, Leung asserts: “interpretation achieves the 
appropriation, explicitness, and unveiling, by putting what is held in fore-having, and 
seen in a particular point of view, into concepts” (Leung, 2010: 27). 
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4.5 Language 
Language is the important medium through which human beings can communicate. 
To Heidegger, language is the house of being, where human being lives. He 
expresses this fundamental idea in his own words and affirms: “Language is the 
house of Being. In its home man dwells. Man is the “shepherd of Being” (Heidegger, 
1978: 217/234). In line with all of the above, Steiner commenting on Heidegger 
affirms: “Dasein is grounded in the language, the intelligibility of being-in-the-world, 
expresses itself and can only expresses itself in discourse. We live, says Heidegger, 
by putting into words the totality-of-significations of intelligibility” (Steiner, 1987: 92). 
 
 
It is from the existential triad situation-understanding-interpretation that we come to 
language in the philosophy of Heidegger. But the problem of language really arises 
in the articulation of explicitness. Indeed, by explaining comprehension through 
language, we produce a meaning. The latter becomes the articulation of the 
agreement. The new moment is that of the statement that brings articulation to the level 
of judgment. In fact, language is seen as a second articulation, the articulation of 
explicitness in statements (Heidegger, 1992: 191). 
 
 
However, the origin of the utterance from understanding and explicitness prepares 
us to say that its primary function is not communication to others or even the attribution 
of predicates to logical subjects, but the faire-valoir, the demonstration, the 
manifestation (Heidegger, 1992: 192). From Heidegger’s point of view, the utterance 
has a meaning insofar as it is based on hearing and represents explicitness as a 
derived form of fulfilment.   It   has   three   meanings:   monstration (epiphany), 
preaching, and communication (Heidegger, 1992: 200-201). Primarily, the statement 
means monstration. We refer here to the original meaning of logos as allowing being 
to see itself. For example, in the statement "the car is out of order", what is revealed 
at first sight is nothing other than being seen from the point of view of its usability and 
not the meaning. The statement as a monstration is the most original intention that 
Aristotle calls apophansis (Heidegger, 1992: 32). 
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Secondly, the utterance can be understood as preaching to the extent that all preaching 
is what it is only as a demonstration. Besides, the links of the predicative articulation, 
subject-predicate are found inside the monstration (epiphany). From this same 
perspective, to determine does not mean to first reveal, but is rather a mode of 
demonstration, to constrain the view to be limited first of all to what is shown as such 
– the car. This passage from the demonstration to preaching is a restriction and not 
an increase because its goal is the derivation of the most original, or at least the 
original (Kangudi, 2006). 
 
 
Thirdly and finally, the utterance means communication, declaration. Taken in this 
sense, communication is directly related to the utterance in the first two meanings. The 
utterance as communication shows others what is shown in their determination. The 
aim of the utterance is to be uttered. It is in the sense that it is said that the utterance 
can be shared with others.  In short, the Heideggerian utterance is a demonstration 
that determines and communicates (Heidegger, 1992: 202). The manifestation that 
the utterance accomplishes is done because of what is discovered in the hearing. It 
(utterance) does not leap into the void to discover being in the primitive state. It is still 
already based on being-in-the-world. It therefore needs a prior knowledge of what is 
generally discovered and which it shows in determining it (Heidegger, 1992: 203). 
 
 
Despite the fact that the speech was addressed in § 34 of Being and Time after the 
feeling of the situation, the understanding, the explanation and the statement, it does 
not diminish the fact that it is the element, in which understanding unfolds. In 
Heidegger's own view, discourse has the same existential level of origin as the feeling 
of the situation, and understanding (Heidegger, 1992: 161). Discourse is the 
articulation of what is understanding. It is also the signifying articulation of the 
understandable structure of being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1992: 200). Clearly, 
speech is what constitutes the expressiveness of the feeling of the situation, and 
understanding. It is at this level that discourse appears as a moment of language, a 
significant articulation of the understanding of being-in-the-world, in its feeling of the 
situation (Heidegger, 1992: 162-200). 
 
 
 
89 
 
According to Ricœur (1969), in Being and Time, to say (le dire) seems to be prior to 
speak (le parler). To say designates the existential constitution, and speaks of its 
mundane aspect, which falls within the empirical. It is for this reason that the first 
determination of to say is not to speak, but the couple "listen and silence". To 
understand is to hear. My relationship to the word is not that I produce it, but that I 
receive it: “hearsay is constitutive of discourse” (Heidegger, 1992: 201). This priority 
of listening marks the fundamental relationship of speech to openness to the world 
and to others. On the same note, Heidegger adds and affirms: “speaking is, “in 
advance”, a hearing; we are only able to speak because “we have already listened to 
language. What do we hear there? We hear language speaking” (Heidegger, 1978: 
411). 
 
 
 
According to Ricœur, commenting on Heidegger, linguistics, semiology and the 
philosophy of language stand ineluctably at the level of speech and do not reach 
the point of saying. In this sense, speech refers to the speaking man, and to say 
refers to things said (Ricoeur, 1986: 94). Before we turn to the notion of authenticity, 
we will first follow the fall of speech into chatter. Talk is talk about something.  As 
Heidegger said: 
 
In any talk or discourse, there is something said-in-the-talk as such [ein 
Geredetes as solches]- something said as such [das … Gesagte als 
solches] whenever one wishes, asks, or expresses oneself about 
something. In this “something said”, discourse communicates (Heidegger, 
1980: 205). 
 
 
Dasein, before standing in a peculiar relationship to his being, is always already 
handed over, to the other Dasein; it is at the level of speech, saying and 
communication. Thus, it shares the general articulation of understanding in 
everyday life. Everydayness is characterised by indifference and the levelling of 
differences (Heidegger, 1992: 43). According to Heidegger, the way of understanding 
Dasein, taken in everyday life, in oneness” and in “theyness”, is mediocrity. The 
latter exempts it from an original understanding. The original relation to the over-
what of the word is lost in the said and the release (Steiner, 1987: 92). 
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One might think that, for Heidegger, the domain of decay covers the whole of the 
communicative understanding, in which the sharing of knowledge, beliefs and ideas 
is constituted. The relation to the "thing itself", the original understanding of the word 
"what-on-what", is lost, to give way to the absence of substance, to the abyss of gossip. 
This lack of background explains why chatter can only rest on repetition and the 
recalled (Nachreden) that is meant to asperse, to gossip pejoratively and emptily 
(Steiner, 1987: 92-93). Here, there is a shift from Gerede (simply talk), that embraces 
the floodtide of trivia, gossip, novelty, cliché, and jargon, to Nachreden. 
 
 
In relationship and repetition, the difference between what is drawn and conquered 
at the source, and what is re-told, fades (Heidegger, 1992: 133). Dasein loses its 
character of clearing to be closed to the relationship and the re-said of advertising. 
The absence of substance is veiled in the evidence and the certainty of everyday life, 
which constitute, with the aid of gossip, the most daily and tenacious reality of Dasein. 
Above the abyss, the bottomless, Dasein stands in suspension, in a strangeness that 
is not worrying to him or her. On the contrary, the assurance he derives from the 
distraction and curiosity, that leads him to see everything and to understand 
everything, leads him even more violently into the vortex of decay. 
 
 
But this forced uprooting involves a very particular temporality. In a way, one could 
certainly say that Dasein is "in" time. Its life is between birth and death. The first belongs 
to a definite past and the second to an undetermined future. Dasein, on the other hand, 
is essentially determined by historicity (historialité) (Heidegger, 1992: 197). It does not 
relate to birth and death in general, but always to his or her death and birth. The 
temporality that extends between birth and death is part of its existential structure. 
The phenomenon of death is an insurmountable possibility and it is interpreted as 
being- towards-the-end (Heidegger, 1980: 293). 
 
 
Even by putting his or her death in the silence of oblivion, Dasein remains a mortal 
being. Death, as an existential, has a paradoxical structure. As an apt possibility, death 
as such is not an experience. I cannot witness my own death (Wittgenstein, 1972: 
84). In everyday life, death presents itself as that of others; it concerns being-with 
91 
 
Dasein. In death, the other Dasein is transformed, in appearance, into a mere being-
at-hand. Dasein leaves his or her world to become a simple corpse under the hand. 
But the interpretation of death as a passage towards being-under-the-hand or being-
at-hand-of- hand, just like the interpretation of the dead as the deceased who remains 
in the world, only obscures the existential character of death (Heidegger, 1980: 293). 
 
 
Being-with in the world includes the representativity of one Dasein by another. In daily 
concern Dasein can always, and essentially, be replaced by another. Here we find 
the generality of “theyness”. In "theyness", one Dasein is equivalent to another. At 
this level, each Dasein can at the same time be his other. This is the place of 
solicitation, where one Dasein puts himself or herself in the place of the other, in 
concern (Heidegger, 1992: 239). 
 
As long as Dasein is, death is a “not-yet” (pas encore). As a possibility, death remains 
of the order of the future. But as soon as Dasein reaches this not-yet, it becomes "no 
longer-being-able-to-be-there" (Heidegger, 1980: 294). Death is the end of Dasein, 
and as an existential, death as an end is part of the very being of Dasein. Just as 
Dasein, as long as he is, is on the contrary constantly his not-yet, so is he also already 
his end. The ending designated by death does not mean a being-at-the-end of 
Dasein, but a being for the end of that being (Heidegger, 1992: 182). In the same 
way, Steiner commenting on Heidegger affirms: 
 
so long as Dasein has not come to its own end, it remains incomplete. It 
has not completed its Gänze (entirety). Dasein - this is an immensely 
important point has access to the meaning of being because, and only 
because, that being is finite. Authentic being is, therefore, a being-
towards-death, a Seinzum-Tode (Steiner, 1987: 99). 
 
 
For Heidegger, speech is co-native with understanding. It is the articulation of 
understanding. Language has its roots in the ontological outbreak of Dasein. Speech 
holds a key role in the authenticity of Dasein and this word of authenticity is not a word 
full of meaning either. We meet silence in two different places: first in the "silence" of 
authentic speech, then in the call of the ethical dimension. 
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According to Heidegger, it is in silence (schweigen) as a mode of speech that an 
authentic understanding is constituted. The one who is silent in the being-one-with- 
the other can give more authentically to understanding, or better configure 
understanding, than the one who never breaks his or her word. An abundance of words 
about something never gives any guarantee that understanding will be increased. On 
the contrary, inexhaustible discussion seemingly covers comprehension and brings 
it to apparent clarity, that is, to the in-comprehensibility of the trivial (Heidegger, 
1992: 131). 
 
 
Inexhaustible discussion brings speech into indeterminacy and insignificance. 
Authentic speech as "silence" can form, authentically and develop understanding. 
This movement of building understanding seems to indicate that understanding is not 
necessarily preliminary to speech. Understanding is not a condition of possibility of 
speech, but, as the existential foundation of Dasein, a co-originator of understanding, 
speech seems to be able to reverse rapports. For speech to be an understanding, 
understanding must itself be translated to speech. This seems to indicate that 
understanding is always articulated. In this respect, Heidegger writes: 
"Comprehensiveness, even before the appropriate explanation, is always 
articulated." Speaking is the articulation of understanding. It is therefore fundamental 
for the explicitness and the statement (Heidegger, 1992: 129). 
 
 
We would be tempted to say that even before utterance and explicitness, 
comprehension is articulated because it is already language. Understanding would 
then be given to language as a possibility that depends on it. The true constitution of 
understanding does not need to be stated. It can take place in the "silence" as the 
authentic mode of speech. On this specific point, Grondin gives the example of the 
understanding of a piece of music or a painting which is done in contemplation and 
which does not need the word (Grondin, 1999: 189). In the meantime, the word is not 
only explicit, it opens being originally, in a new understanding, that precedes as its 
condition of possibility. 
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For Heidegger, "keeping-silence" remains a mode of speech. It does not necessarily 
imply complete silence, the absence of any word. "Silence" does not mean to be silent. 
"Silence" does not mean refraining from speaking. According to Heidegger, one can 
in a sense "silence" only the one who truly speaks: "Only in true speaking can 
authentic silence become possible" (Heidegger, 1992: 165). Whoever speaks little or 
does not speak cannot be silenced. If, therefore, silence is a moment of speech, if 
with silence speech becomes authentic speech, silence could be conceived as the 
moment of "scansion". It is not itself a word, a statement, a sentence, the moment of 
silence, that punctuates a word, making a meaning come to it. 
 
 
 
Briefly, it is only in real speaking that authentic silence becomes possible. Silence is 
later also the voice of conscience that calls Dasein from the nothingness of the world 
into the "reticence" of its existing power-being. 
 
 
4.6  Ontologization of understanding: critical appreciation 
By starting his hermeneutics with the inauguration of a new question, Heidegger does 
not provide a solution to the problem posed especially by Dilthey. He did not eliminate 
the Diltheyan aporia from a theory of understanding, condemned in turn to oppose 
the naturalistic explanation and to compete with it in objectivity and scientificity. This 
aporia is only transported (diverted) elsewhere and thereby aggravated. It is no 
longer in the epistemology between two modalities of knowing, but between ontology 
and epistemology taken as a whole (Ricoeur, 1986: 94). 
 
 
With the Heideggerian philosophy, we continue to practice the movement back to the 
foundations. Moreover, we are unable to proceed with the return movement, which 
from fundamental ontology, would lead back to the properly epistemological question 
of the status of the sciences of the mind. But a philosophy that does not engage with 
science exists only for itself. Moreover, it is only on the return journey that the claim 
is holding the questions of exegesis in particular and in general of historical criticism 
for derived questions (Ricoeur, 1986: 94-95). It is in this sense, that we think that as 
long as we have not actually made this derivation, the overcoming of the foundation 
questions remains problematic. 
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According to Ricœur (1969), the ontology of understanding is a short way to the extent 
that it breaks with methodological debates. Hence, it is an ontology of finite being, in 
which to understand it is no longer a mode of knowledge, but a mode of being (Ricoeur, 
1969: 10). It is for this reason Kangudi, as inspired by Ricœur, supports the idea that 
shows that self-understanding passes through other channels of interpretation and 
reinterpretation (Kangudi, 2006). 
 
 
However, Heidegger's new approach to understanding marked a fundamental turning 
point for hermeneutics. Indeed, the ontologization of understanding by Heidegger, 
understood existentially, and the temporal interpretation that it gives the mode of being 
of Dasein, made it possible to rehabilitate and to emphasize the structures of 
anticipation of the understanding (Gadamer, 1996: 137). 
 
 
By digging in this ontological soil, Heidegger shows that what was once considered 
as an obstacle to knowledge is actually, what precedes and is the basis of 
knowledge. It is in this sense that the structures of anticipations of understanding, 
namely prejudices, authority and tradition, are the soil on which all knowledge about 
the sciences of the mind is built, and thus are no longer what barricades the road to 
knowledge. 
 
 
As a result, there is in the author of Being and Time a refutation of the claim of the pure 
subject in knowledge, because the latter is always already known as a subject who 
is situated, who has a tradition. This strong conviction of Heidegger leads us to think 
that he (Heidegger) would have supported the contribution of what is not rational in 
knowledge, especially in its first stages. 
 
 
All of Heidegger's hermeneutics, as valuing tradition, want to teach us that all thought 
must always be part of a tradition and that if we know it is because we are constitutively 
capable of knowledge or open to knowledge. Consequently, the value of Heidegger 
is to have highlighted the fact that to understand is a mode of being of Dasein, which 
is not a theoretical knowledge. From this perspective, the hermeneutics of Heidegger 
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is the one that digs to the roots of our knowledge. For us Africans, it is an interpellation 
so that we can reconsider our tradition to establish our thought. 
 
 
 
 4.7 Conclusion 
In this fourth section of this work, we discussed the great Wendung that Heidegger 
performed in hermeneutics. We attempted to answer the question “what is the mode 
of this being that exists only by understanding?” 
 
 
Indeed, in Dilthey, the question of understanding goes hand in hand with the problem 
of others, but in Being and Time, this question is to be sought from the point of view 
of being with the world. In other words, Heidegger de-psychologizes it by 
mundanizing understanding. The question of the world takes the place of the question 
of others. 
 
The world, for our author, is an existential. All that one encounters there are things that, 
before being mere presences, are instruments. After analyzing the Heideggerian 
world, we tried to highlight what Heidegger himself calls the pre-comprehension 
structures, including prejudices, authority and tradition. These structures, once 
obstacles to knowledge, become in Heidegger what knowledge is based on. 
 
 
As for understanding, we have analyzed it in the existential triad through the feeling 
of the situation, understanding and interpretation. Befindlichkeit is the way to find 
oneself, to feel one way or the other, or to put it better, the emotional tone in which 
we happen to be.  Heideggerian understanding is essentially a project. It is the 
apprehension of a possibility of being. This is what we have named to understand as 
being able to be. But before we got there, we had to show with Levinas that anguish, 
as a worrying quest for being, is itself a kind of understanding. 
 
 
To understand is a way of being. Understanding is not theoretical, but practical 
knowledge. It is understood here as situational knowledge. The third concept of the 
trilogy is explicitness, which is nothing more than the extension, development, and 
unfolding of understanding. It is by articulating the explicitness in statements that one 
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arrives at language. The statement in the Heideggerian sense is essentially a 
demonstration. In his analysis, the author of Being and Time, prefers to say it in relation 
to speech because saying designates the existential constitution and speaking only 
designates its mundane aspect, which falls within the empirical. In the opinion of the 
Black Forest philosopher, the first determination of “to say” is the couple listen-to 
silence. 
 
 
Despite the great turn he has made in hermeneutics, and by his rehabilitation of the 
anticipation structures of understanding, Heidegger failed to resolve the difficulty 
inherent in Dilthey's legacy. His no less commendable effort is limited to the 
transposition of the Diltheyan aporia within ontology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This investigation was conducted into the concept of Understanding in Martin 
Heidegger’s view, in the dynamic of overcoming epistemology towards ontology. It 
highlighted the ontological turn made in hermeneutics by Heidegger. It covered 
respectively the epistemology of understanding, the eternal and traditional question of 
being in the history of Western philosophy, and the ontology of understanding. 
 
 
The first chapter served as the general introduction. The second chapter was about 
the epistemology of understanding. I discussed the views of Schleiermacher and of 
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Dilthey.   The Schleiermacherian understanding is an intropathique process by 
means of which the subject moves into a foreign consciousness in the face-to-face 
situation. To understand a text means to endeavour to read the mind of its author. 
With Dilthey, understanding is exclusive to the sciences of the mind and explanation 
belongs to the sciences of nature. Understanding is nothing else here than knowledge 
of the sign, a psychological process that leads to the knowledge of others. 
 
 
The third chapter addressed the eternal and traditional question of being in the history 
of Western philosophy. Heidegger traced the seeds of oblivion to the question of being 
to the beginning of the history of Western philosophy. Thus, being has been reduced 
to beings. Clearly, it is the forgetting of being that is enshrined in metaphysics and 
any theory of knowledge. 
 
 
This is what forced Heidegger to seek the foundation of a new ontology: fundamental 
ontology, the science that deals with the being of Dasein, because he is the only one 
who can question his being. This important shift in Heidegger's philosophy is a 
gateway: from the epistemology to the ontology of understanding. 
 
 
 
The fourth chapter focused on the ontologization of understanding. In Heidegger’s 
view, understanding is a behaviour of Dasein; a mode of living of Dasein in the world, 
where human being is always already thrown. This shift is a real revolution in 
philosophical hermeneutics because Heidegger emphasized the subordination of 
methodological or epistemological questions to ontological questions by highlighting 
the primacy of ontology over epistemology. Thus, Heidegger demonstrated that the 
problem of understanding is totally isolated from that of others and linked to that of 
the world. In short, Heidegger mundanised understanding. There is, so to say, a 
worldization, or mundanization of understanding, which imbricates its de-
psychologization. According to Heidegger, understanding is always extended into 
interpretation that leads to language. Interpretation is, accordingly, a development or 
explication of the understanding that is articulated in language. 
 
 
In line with all of the above, Heidegger deserves credit for rehabilitating the structure 
of pre-comprehension, which is often considered an obstacle to knowledge. The 
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philosopher of the Black Forest must therefore be credited with having made it clear 
that the ontological problem precedes that of epistemology because the latter is itself 
based on ontology. 
 
 
But Heidegger failed to eliminate the dichotomy of a theory of understanding that 
maintains opposition to naturalistic explanation. He did not solve this dichotomy, but 
it is transported elsewhere and thereby aggravated. In short, this turning point 
remains problematic insofar as, after the explanation of the ontology of 
understanding, Heidegger could not rest the critical question. 
 
 
 
Finally, with Ricœur, we agreed to break the impasse in which is found the 
Heideggerian ontology; phenomenology must be situated between Heideggerian 
ontology and reflective philosophy, which opts for a longer and diverted way of an 
interpretation of the signs, where the desire to be and the effort to exist, which 
constitute us, are themselves expressed and explained. 
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